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Sammendrag 
 
Forskningsbaserte oppstartsbedrifter (USOs) har bevist sitt potensiale som en 
verdiskapende strategi for å kommersialisere forskning fra universiteter til 
marked. De er derimot komplekse enheter, som ofte lider under mangel på 
ressurser. Denne masteroppgaven er delt inn i to deler, hvorav den første tar 
for seg en litteraturstudie som kartlegger litteratur om betydningen av 
nettverk for USOs. Funnene presenteres i perspektiv av ressursbasert teori 
(Resource Based Theory) og sosial kapital-teori (Social Capital Theory). 
Generelle linjer i litteraturen avdekkes, og det fremlegges avslutningsvis en 
modell som beskriver situasjonen for USOs. 
 
Del to går dypere og mer spesifikt til verks, og har til hensikt å undersøke 
fordelene som tilbys av nettverket til styret for USOs. Studien bygger på 
funnene fra del én, i tillegg til “Board Capital” teori. Gjennom en kvantitativ 
analyse av 70 norske USOs ser vi på suksessraten til denne typen bedrifter i 
forbindelse med den initielle  styresammensetning  
 
Våre funn tyder på at styrer med nettverk fra tidligere entreprenører og 
ledererfaring fra seniornivå øker sannsynligheten for suksess. Videre foreslår 
vi et sett implikasjoner som kan hjelpe akademiske entreprenører og USOs i å 
skaffe den rette kombinasjonen av erfaring til sine initielle styrer. 
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Abstract 
University spin-offs (USOs) are a phenomenon that has proven to be a successful method for 
commercializing knowledge and technology developed in universities. However, these ventures 
often lack an initial resource base and legitimacy towards external actors, hence struggling to 
bring their ideas to market. This study draws the attention towards (1) the benefits present in 
USOs’ initial network, and (2) what type of network that constitutes these benefits.  A theoretical 
framework is presented, consisting of resource-based theory and social capital theory, used to 
characterize the network benefits that are being exchanged. More specifically, we argue that a 
non-redundant network provides access to valuable resources, help USOs gain legitimacy, and 
offer timely information and advice, which is positively correlated with USO performance. This 
study aims to provide a theoretical model to be used as a basis for further research. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this study is to identify the benefits 
available for USOs in their networks, and how 
the characteristics of these networks are. In 
our changing society the role of universities as 
a source for creating opportunities is 
important. Universities have been involved in 
commercialisation of technology ever since 
they were first established (Shane, 2004), but 
have lately increased over time as the 
institutional environment has become more 
supportive towards commercial activity 
(Djokovic & Souitaris, 2008). In the United 
States the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act is 
mentioned as one of the contributors to this 
trend. 
 
University spin-offs (USOs) constitute a way of 
transferring knowledge from universities to 
commercial use, and enhance 
commercialisation by being an effective vehicle 
for uncertain technologies and encouraging 
inventor involvement. This formal mode of 
transfer has resulted in an increasing number 
of companies spun out over the recent years (O 
Shea, Allen, O Gorman, & Roche, 2004). USOs 
benefit society in various ways. They encourage 
economic development by generating 
economic value, creating jobs, inducing 
investment in university technologies and 
promoting local economic development 
(Wright, 2007). They also help universities 
with their mission of scholarly research and 
teaching by supporting additional research, 
attract and retain faculty and help train 
students (Shane, 2004). 
 
Shane (2004) found USOs to be high 
performing companies with a substantially 
higher success rate than other start-ups. They 
are more likely to experience initial public 
offerings, raise venture capital and survive over 
time than the average start-up. Nonetheless, 
there are few success stories, even when 
investigating long lasting USOs (Chiesa & 
Piccaluga, 2000). Wright et al. (2012) further 
state that USOs are rare, atypical entities, 
which, in the forming, often lack a business 
plan, and are struggling in raising the 
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necessary funding. In addition, they often 
comprise cutting-edge technology, demanding 
a large resource base to develop and 
commercialize their product (Shane & Stuart, 
2002). Universities tend to possess some of 
these resources, such as technological expertise 
and access to skilled personnel. In the aspect of 
other resources however, such as leveraging 
competencies and external network towards 
industry and investors, there seems to be a 
deficiency (Perez & Sanchez, 2003; Wright, 
Clarysse, Lockett, & Knockaert, 2008). 
Although some researchers state that USOs are 
more effective at generating income for the 
university than for example licensing (Shane, 
2004), they are dependent on establishing 
linkages to a variety of external actors.  
 
The need to obtain external resources to 
overcome initial disadvantages and to pursue 
opportunities is acknowledged as the 
entrepreneurial challenge (Brush, Greene, & 
Hart, 2001). In the process of gathering 
knowledge and other resources, the pre-
existing network of the founding team is an 
essential resource (Sullivan & Marvel, 
2011).  Rothaermel et al. (2007) state that 
research on network in this initial phase is 
needed, and Djokovic and Souitaris (2008) 
further mention research on post-formation 
development and growth of spin-offs as an 
important area. Another interesting area for 
research is the interaction between networks 
and other potential determinants of spinout 
structure and performance (Djokovic & 
Souitaris, 2008). Further, Brush et al. (2001) 
state that network is used as a tool to gain 
access to resources, and that these are of 
crucial importance for USOs. Results from this 
study can serve as a toolbox, where 
entrepreneurs can discover what benefits they 
can harvest from their existing network, and 
potential benefits by developing their network. 
 
The aim of our study is to highlight the role of 
social capital for USOs in their early phase. 
Specifically, we focus on the following research 
questions: (1) what are the main benefits of 
being connected to a network for USOs? (2) 
which network characteristics constitute these 
benefits? In this paper, we first define the term 
USO, followed by a brief review of the central 
theoretical frameworks in resource-based 
theory (RBT) and social capital theory (SCT). 
We use SCT to enlighten the dependence USOs 
have on establishing external linkages, and 
argue that RBT is convenient to use for 
describing social capital as a critical resource 
available to USOs. SCT and RBT need to be 
simultaneously considered and integrated to 
better explain entrepreneurial performance 
(Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001). We contend that 
network is a vital bridge for USOs to acquire 
external resources, information, advice and 
legitimacy. The relevant articles from a 
systematic literature search are reviewed and 
organized into content, structure and 
governance as labels. We then review the 
literature and investigate what benefits a 
network offers to USOs and the characteristics 
of these networks. Furthermore, we propose 
two normative propositions, based on our 
findings. Finally, we discuss the limitations 
and implications from the study, and give 
suggestions for further research. 
 
University Spin-off 
Companies 
“There is a tremendous iceberg phenomenon 
at work in these organizations” (McMullan & 
Vesper, 1987: 354). 
 
As our paper revolves around USOs and their 
attributes, it is important to define what we 
mean by the phenomenon. The number of 
definitions on USOs almost equals the number 
of researchers who have written about it. The 
implications of using different definitions of 
USOs severely impact the results of these 
studies. If a researcher uses a strict definition 
of USO, and a following scholar misinterprets 
this in his paper, he might assign or assume 
characteristics that are not actually present for 
his subjects. If this continues, the 
misinterpretations might accumulate beyond 
the comprehensible, thus harming future 
research (Carayannis, Rogers, Kurihara, & 
Allbritton, 1998; Pirnay, Surlemont, & Nlemvo, 
2003; Roberts & Malonet, 1996; Steffensen, 
Rogers, & Speakman, 2000) 
 
The definitions for USOs differ largely. To 
illustrate this we use the definitions from 
respectively Wright et al. (2006) and Clarysse 
et al. (2011). 
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Table 1. Comparison of USO definitions 
Author Wright et al. (2006) Clarysse et al. (2011) 
Definition “A start-up company whose formation is 
dependent on the formal transfer of 
intellectual property rights from the 
university and in which the university holds 
an equity stake.” 
“A new company that is formed by a faculty, staff 
member, or doctoral student who left the university to 
found the company or start the company while still 
affiliated with the university and/or a core technology 
(or idea) that is transferred from the parent 
organization.” 
 
The differences often tend to be along a 
common set of dimensions. As seen above, 
these dimensions can include origin, 
technology, team and mode of transfer. Pirnay 
et al. (2003) address these definitional 
ambiguities in their in-depth review of previous 
definitions used. They use the characteristics 
“who?”, “how?” and “what?” to describe their 
definition. 
 
Table 2. Authors and terms 
Characteristics\Authors Wright et al. (2006) Clarysse et al. (2011) 
The concerned individuals (Who?) No restrictions Faculty, staff member or doctoral 
student 
The relationships between 
individuals and their university 
(How?) 
No restrictions (University 
ownership) 
The founders may either leave the 
university to start their company; or 
remain affiliated with the university. 
The origin of the USO activities 
(What?) 
Technology-based ideas 
developed within the university 
- Implied 
A core technology that is transferred 
from the parent organization to the 
spin-off firm 
 
The concerned individuals. Spin-offs do not 
form spontaneously. It is an effect of an 
individual or a team who have discovered an 
opportunity they want to pursue through the 
formation of a new company. If the technology 
is invented by hired personnel with substantial 
research experience (Clarysse, Heirman, & 
Degroof, 2000), the affiliation with the 
university is as strong as it can be. However, a 
firm can also stem from other employees or 
students. Above, we see how Wright et al. 
(2006) approve of spin-offs regardless of the 
concerned individuals, while Clarysse et al. 
(2011) has specified their constraints. Many 
researchers have definitions that exclude firms 
most other scholars would include. They often 
classify the firms close to USOs with other 
definitions. “Academic spin-offs”  (ASOs) are 
created to commercially exploit some 
promising results obtained by university 
researchers, whereas “student driven spin-offs” 
are firms launched to exploit a commercial 
opportunity, rarely grounded on extensive 
research activities (Pirnay et al., 2003). 
 
The relationships between individuals and 
their university are also used in many 
definitions. Some scholars are quite restrictive 
by stating that the founders have to leave their 
earlier positions at the university for the firm 
to be classified as a USO (Bellini et al., 1999). 
Others classify the firm as a USO as long as the 
founders are former employees of the parent 
organisation (Carayannis et al., 1998; Roberts, 
1991; Shane, 2004). 
 
The origin of the USO activities contends the 
type of technology invention and the place it 
was invented. From the definitions above, we 
see how Wright et al.  (2006) include ideas, 
regardless of origin. However, as the definition 
requires formal transfer of knowledge, 
including a legal instrument, i.e. a patent, one 
can contend that knowledge has been produced 
within the university. Clarysse et al. (2011) 
however, only include core technology. Others, 
like Shane (2004), include only firms based on 
a piece of intellectual property created in the 
organisation. Shane states with this a clear 
requirement for the nature of knowledge 
transfer (Pirnay et al., 2003). 
 
In addition to the characteristics concerning 
the parties involved and the origin of the idea, 
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the transfer of knowledge constitutes how 
information is transferred in between. This 
transfer can happen through different modes. 
The choice of mode should primarily depend 
on what type of knowledge that is being 
transferred, and the opportunities for 
exploitation (Grimpe & Hussinger, 2008). 
Formal transfer mechanisms transfer codified 
knowledge, like licensing and acquisition of 
patents. This knowledge is generally distinct 
from the person that generated it (Pirnay et al., 
2003). It can therefore easily be transferred 
and distributed (Callon, 1999), but it can also 
be copied or imitated (De Bondt, 1997). 
Informal technology transfer on the other 
hand, transfers tacit knowledge. It is more 
concerned with pieces of knowledge 
accumulated by an individual over time. 
Codified and tacit knowledge are intertwined. 
The person that produced the codified 
knowledge might be more suited to utilize it. 
This implies that transfer of codified and tacit 
knowledge goes well together (Siegel, 
Waldman, Atwater, & Link, 2003). 
 
Our definition of USOs 
In defining our view on USOs for this paper, we 
use the definition from Pirnay et al. (2003) as a 
starting point. Many universities have close 
linkages to research organizations. To address 
these relations in our definition, we include 
these organizations and define USOs as; “new 
firms created, by individuals who are, or were 
former, employees of the parenting 
organization, to exploit commercially some 
knowledge, technology or research results 
developed within the parent organization - 
being a university or a university-partnering 
research organization.” 
 
With this definition, we narrow our reach by 
requiring that a current or former employee of 
the university be connected to the firm. This 
excludes pure student-driven spin-offs. We are 
not directly addressing the transfer of 
knowledge. However, the joining of employees 
from the parent organization implies formal 
transfer of tacit knowledge. There are no 
requirements regarding codified knowledge 
being transferred. 
 
Within this definition, firm heterogeneity is 
still large. With Pirnay et al.’s (2003) 
definition, firms from emerging ideas will still 
be included, although a university might not be 
the reason for the creation. 
Theoretical 
background 
This section will present the different 
theoretical perspectives used as a basis for 
underpinning our framework. We first address 
resource-based theory, both in the context of 
firms in general and USOs. We then introduce 
social capital theory. 
 
Resource-based theory 
The resource-based view (RBV) can be seen as 
an excellent starting point for analysis of the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of firms 
(Barney, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1984). The 
perspective focuses on the internal part of the 
organization and assumes that it consists of 
bundles of resources, which by the right 
distribution, combinations and strategy, can 
lead the firm to achieving sustained 
competitive advantage (Sørheim, 2003). The 
possibility of competitive advantage depends 
on properties of the surroundings and the 
resources that must be present.  
 
Peteraf (1993) presents a perspective regarding 
theoretical conditions concerning the 
environment. These conditions are 
heterogeneity, imperfect resource mobility, ex 
post limits to competition and ex ante limits to 
competition. This is an important foundation 
for a lot of the resource-based views, 
incorporating the position and mobility into 
the value of a resource - justifying the 
complexity of resources.  
 
 
Figure 1. The cornerstones of competitive advantage 
(Peteraf, 1993) 
 
Heterogeneity concerns the assumption of 
differences in the availability of resources. This 
condition of different sets of resources makes 
the position of firms an interesting landscape 
of positions with varying opportunities. This 
also implies that two firms may not be able to 
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benefit equally from the same strategy, making 
the process of developing resources a specific 
and individual task. 
 
Ex ante limits to competition is the assumption 
of limited competitors competing for the same 
position initially. It prevents the cost of 
expenses getting large due to competition, 
which would eliminate possible rents. Rumelt 
(2005) points this out by claiming that unless 
there is a positive difference between ex post 
value of a venture and the ex ante cost of 
acquiring a resource, the entrepreneurial rents 
are zero. It is the ex ante uncertainty that 
creates profit. We contend that parallels to 
arbitrage in currency trading can be drawn. If a 
trader knew that a currency would go up the 
next day, he would buy today and sell 
tomorrow. 
 
Ex post limits to competition builds on the 
condition of heterogeneity. It states that if 
heterogeneity is not constant, the rent1 will be 
fleeting, as new competition will arise. To make 
the heterogeneity durable, forces that limit 
competition for the rents must be in place. 
Imperfect imitability and imperfect 
substitutability are two critical factors in 
limiting ex post competition. 
 
Imperfect resource mobility binds the rents in 
regards to the initial position gained by 
heterogeneity. It comprises that resources have 
different value depending on what positions 
they are used in. Two resources, seemingly 
equal, may have a different value due to their 
different positions. The assumption of 
imperfect resource mobility assumes a cost in 
moving the resources, making the positions of 
the two resources essential. Switching and 
transaction costs imply that every new position 
will contain marginally less value, thus 
imperfect mobility. Resources may also be 
non-tradable. 
 
The resource-based approach (Barney, 1991; 
Grant, 1991) uses the conditions from Peteraf 
(1993) and assumes that the resources 
available are heterogeneously distributed 
across firms, and that these differences persist 
over time. Rugman and Verbeke (2002) and 
Rumelt (1997)) focus on how firms can achieve 
competitive advantage, by creating isolating 
mechanisms and resource superiority with 
                                                            
1 Peteraf (1993) defines rents as earnings in excess of 
break even, if their existence does not induce new 
competition. 
firm-level investments in resources and 
capabilities. The isolating mechanisms of RBV 
are tools firms use to sustain their position and 
keep their rivals from re-establishing the 
balance. 
 
Peteraf’s (1993) conditions explain the 
surroundings, and how they facilitate 
competitive advantage. Barney (1991) further 
elaborated on the resources the firm must 
possess to achieve this position. Not all 
resources have equal value in the context of 
competitive advantage, and Barney (1991)  has 
theorized that a resource must be valuable, 
rare, inimitable and non-substitutable to be 
competitive (Barney, 1991). However, even 
resources with all these properties do not have 
the potential to create sustained competitive 
when used on its own. The value increases 
when these resources are complementary and 
used together (Grant, 1991). Grant presents 
how capabilities are the organization’s ability 
to govern the resources more effectively than 
competitors, being the basis of competitive 
advantage. 
 
Different categorisations of the resources are 
used to view the firms in the RBV literature. 
Grant (1991) uses tangible, intangible and 
personnel-based resources to describe the firm, 
while Barney (1991) classifies the resources in 
physical capital, human capital and 
organizational capital resources. Physical 
capital differs from Grant’s tangible assets as it 
also encompasses physical technology used by 
the firm, as well as the geographical position. 
Barney defines human capital resources as 
intelligence, relationships, training, 
experience, judgment and insights of the 
individuals in the firm. Organizational capital 
resources consist of firm’s formal reporting 
structure, formal and informal planning and 
relationships with other firms and actors in 
their environment. 
 
Differences in definitions have existed since 
the establishment of RBV, but scholars tend to 
build and reference to other authors in 
choosing and combining their preferred 
resource classification. The resource-based 
theory explains which resources that give a 
competitive advantage. The dynamic capability 
approach however, a strand that emerged from 
RBV (Rugman & Verbeke, 2002), takes into 
account the value the resources possess and 
how they are structured to develop competitive 
advantages (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
The combination of resources and their 
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infrastructure are important aspects classic 
RBV does not take into account. Teece et al. 
(1997) state that dynamic capabilities reflect a 
firm’s ability to achieve new and innovative 
forms of competitive advantage. They point out 
a focus on disequilibria, continuous 
recombination of resources and firm-level 
responses to an ever-changing environment 
(Rugman & Verbeke, 2002). It is important to 
note that dynamic capabilities alone cannot 
serve as a source for competitive advantage, 
but only in combination with a set of resources 
that are developed in balance (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Rugman & Verbeke, 2002). 
 
The Entrepreneurial Challenge 
“That strategy is based on resource strengths 
is obvious. The more important question that 
remains to be answered is: What if you don't 
have any resource strengths?" Wernerfelt 
(1997). 
 
The strategy for achieving competitive 
advantage is often a plan for how to develop, 
combine and configure the strength of existing 
resources. For entrepreneurs who do not 
already have these strong resources, the 
challenge is different. The Entrepreneurial 
Challenge (Brush et al., 2001) comprises the 
identifying, attracting, attaining, combining 
and transforming of resources into a strong 
initial resource base for the organization. 
Vohora et al. (2004) acknowledge this distinct 
challenge for USOs and also identifies that 
there are “critical junctures” in terms of 
resources and capabilities that a USO needs to 
acquire to continue developing. These concepts 
of resources and capabilities are intertwined 
and entrepreneurs in emerging organizations 
are dependent on constructing a foundation of 
resources where capabilities and resources can 
develop together (Brush et al., 2001). 
 
In this paper, we review USOs in their initial 
phase. Most of the literature on RBV focuses 
on mature firms, and most of the resource 
categories that are used are in context of large, 
established firms. Brush et al. (2001) 
acknowledged this lack of resource typology for 
early stage ventures and reviewed the literature 
on small business growth. They identified the 
following resources to be important; capital, 
organizational systems, management know-
how, employees, owner’s expertise and 
reputation, technology, physical, leadership, 
organizational structure and culture. Further, 
Brush et al. (2001) categorized the resources of 
early stage ventures into six types: 
technological, human, social, financial, 
physical and organizational resources. Each 
resource follows a scale of complexity, ranging 
from simple to complex. 
 
Simple resources are tangible, discrete and 
property-based. These are simple in the sense 
of being tangible quantifiable, and are easily 
imitable. Complex resources are intangible, 
systemic and knowledge-based, and are 
difficult to identify, measure and imitate. The 
resources are also rated on their application, 
ranging from utilitarian to instrumental. 
Utilitarian resources, for instance physical 
resources, are easily utilized and applied 
directly or combined in the productive process. 
Instrumental resources are used to provide 
access to other resources. Figure 2 shows the 
different scales (Brush et al., 2001). 
 
 
Figure 2. The resource development pathway (Brush 
et al., 2001). 
 
Following the encouragement from Pirnay et 
al. (2003) to facilitate the accumulation of 
knowledge in this field of research, we adopt 
the work from Brush et al. (2001) and use the 
categories technological, human, financial and 
physical resources in our framework for our 
data sample. The alert reader has probably 
detected that we do not include the social 
resources category in Brush et al.’s (2001) 
framework. The phenomenon of social 
resources is very intertwined with the concept 
of social capital, which is the next theoretical 
topic we will present. We thus choose to cover 
the social resources in the context of social 
capital, as this will prevent confusion between 
these highly connected terms. Organizational 
resources are excluded from our framework, as 
we do not see them as relevant for USOs in the 
initial phase. 
 
In the process of gathering and combining 
resources, having a network of relationships 
constitutes as a valuable resource as it provides 
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its members of collectively owned capital 
(Bourdieu, 2010). Brush et al. (2001) define 
‘social resources’ as industrial and financial 
contacts. Others take a more specific approach 
and refer to these social resources as the 
network or the social capital of the company 
(Lee et al., 2001). We will elaborate further on 
the concept of social capital in the next 
subsection. As quality relationships are 
valuable, not easily transformed, and very 
difficult to imitate, we define social capital as a 
key resource regarding the potential for 
competitive advantage (Sørheim, 2003). 
 
Social Capital 
Social capital is becoming increasingly popular 
among many disciplines. The fields of 
sociology, political science, and economy have 
used social capital in research (Adler & Kwon, 
2002), and it has been used to describe several 
social phenomena including community life, 
public health and education (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). Social capital is seen as the 
resources gained through networks (Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998; Taheri & van Geenhuizen, 
2011). The theory is based on the prediction 
that people who do better are better connected 
(Burt, 2000). The definition of social capital 
differs, depending on the scope of the study. 
Greve (1995) covers only the structure of 
networks, while Berg et al. (2007) include 
resources that may be accessed through the 
network. As opposed to other forms of capital, 
social capital cannot be traded on an open 
market (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). It is 
shared capital, embedded in the network 
(Leana & Van Buren, 1999; Lin, 1999). 
 
Social capital and social resources are terms 
that are frequently used to describe this 
phenomenon. Some confusion arises because 
of the various interpretations of the words 
capital and resources. Where many argue that 
it is acceptable to interpret these equally, we 
decide to differentiate the terms slightly. In 
Adler and Kwon’s (2002) paper, we find them 
presenting how social capital, like other forms 
of capital, can either be a substitute for, or a 
catalysing complement, to other resources. 
Using this to construct our own analogue; 
Social capital can be viewed as a phone line 
between two individuals, and the social 
resources are the words that are being shared. 
In this way, we see capital as the tool of 
communication, whilst resources are the 
benefits of it. Further, we use a 
multidimensional approach, adopted from 
Hoang and Antoncic’s (2003) and divide 
network it into (1) structure, (2) governance, 
and (3) content. 
 
Network structure: The dynamics of social 
structures have a great impact on the resource 
flow, and the amount of resources available to 
the venture (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). 
Network structure is defined by Hoang and 
Antoncic (2003: 170) as “...the pattern of direct 
and indirect ties between actors”. The amount 
of resources available is measured by the 
network size (Aldrich & Reese, 1993) and the 
ventures centrality in the network 
(Johannisson, Alexanderson, Nowicki, & 
Senneseth, 1994; Taheri & van Geenhuizen, 
2011). Centrality is the ventures position in the 
network, and its ability to access and control 
resources (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). 
 
Structural position and strength of ties are 
concepts in the network structure that affect 
the diversity of resources (Hoang & Antoncic, 
2003). The structural position can either be 
dense or loose (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). In 
a dense network, every partner is connected, 
and mutual trust and credibility make such 
networks beneficial for reducing cost of 
knowledge exchange (Coleman, 1990). 
Coleman (1990) argues that closure of network 
structure breed trustworthiness and facilitates 
the emergence of norms. Granovetter (1973) 
however, suggests that loose networks provide 
benefits from the diversity of knowledge and 
brokerage opportunities. Individuals with few 
weak ties will be deprived of information from 
distant external actors, and are only confined 
to information from close friends. Burt (1992) 
supports this direction and claims that a loose 
network, with few redundant contacts provides 
more benefits. He argues that structural holes, 
being the missing link between two clusters 
with non-redundant information (Burt, 2002), 
offers opportunities to access additive 
information when “bridging” the two clusters. 
Groups, separated by a structural hole, are 
aware of one another, but focus on their own 
activities, each with different flows of 
information. Burt stated that “these holes offer 
an opportunity to broker the flow of 
information between people, and control the 
projects that bring together people from 
opposite sides of the hole” (Burt, 2000: 353).  
 
The concept of strength of ties refers to the 
intensity of the relationships (Taheri & van 
Geenhuizen, 2011). Strong relationships 
develop during long-term interactions, and 
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help facilitate transfer of new knowledge. 
There is also a contradicting viewpoint here, 
where the “strength of weak ties” (Granovetter, 
1973) state that resources are obtained through 
casual meetings, where the information flow is 
non-redundant (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). 
Actors, connected through strong ties, are 
more likely to interact frequently, and this 
information tends to be the same, restricting 
diversity (Jack, 2005). However, there are 
studies showing that networks with little 
redundancy do not function as well when the 
transferred information is uncertain (Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998). The studies on network 
structure hence has yielded inconclusive 
results, but the general consensus is that 
network structure influences the accessibility 
of network benefits (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). 
 
Network governance: Network governance 
is the element that explains the coordination of 
the network exchange (Hoang & Antoncic, 
2003). The transfer of information can be 
smooth and effective by governance 
mechanisms, such as trust, power or influence 
(Krackhardt, 1990; Larson, 1992). Coleman 
(1989) emphasizes that a dense network 
facilitates sanctions that make it less risky for 
the network participants to trust one another. 
A relationship governed by mutual trust reduce 
transaction costs, given that both participants 
can assume that the other party takes actions 
that are predictable and mutually acceptable 
(Uzzi, 1997). Many scholars have stated that 
developed governance mechanisms can create 
cost advantages, compared to bureaucratic 
mechanisms (Thorelli, 1986). Information is 
costly, and channels that reduce the amount of 
time and costs are required (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). With a trusted relationship, 
both parties can easier predict their 
counterpart’s actions, and hence lower the 
transaction costs (Uzzi, 1997). 
 
Network content: Network content explains 
the resources and benefits that are being 
exchanged between actors in a network. Advice 
and information are examples on benefits 
provided by a network (Hoang & Antoncic, 
2003). Entrepreneurs use networks as a main 
source to access opportunities and get new 
ideas (Singh, Hills, Hybels, & Lumpkin, 1999), 
and provide access to both tangible and 
intangible resources (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) go as far as 
to state that business opportunities can in 
general only be realized if the venture manages 
to participate in collaborations. To have access 
to information before actors outside the 
network, gives an advantage when for example 
speed to market may be a key factor. Higgins 
and Gulati (2000) state that network content is 
not only exchange of information, advice, and 
access to resources. Network includes also a 
reputational effect. Both Nicolaou and Birley 
(2003) and Burt (1992) suggest that referral is 
one of the main benefits of network ties. USOs 
are operating in an uncertain environment, 
and for potential investors, referrals are of 
great value before deciding on whether or not 
to invest in an entrepreneur’s idea. Venture 
capitalists are more inclined to invest in 
companies that have been referred to by 
trusted actors (Shane & Cable, 2002; Sorenson 
& Stuart, 2001). 
 
In the context of USOs: Social capital has 
received little attention in the literature 
surrounding university spin-offs. There is 
however, a general consensus that social 
capital often assists entrepreneurs in obtaining 
access to venture capital, information and 
potential customers (Liao & Welsch, 2005). We 
can easily see the advantages of having a 
founding team with ties to different clusters, 
bridging the potential structural holes USOs 
face. As they lack a majority of the resources 
needed to commercialize their venture, 
bridging structural holes are crucial to access 
these resources fast. Brüderl and Preisendörfer 
(1998) empirically showed that networks  gave 
USOs access to resources, and further 
enhanced the survival and growth potential. An 
important issue facing USOs, are the liabilities 
of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). They often 
introduce a new technology, or a new use of 
existing technologies, and networks can work 
as a response to insecurity arising (Diez, 
2000). Strong ties to external actors offer 
legitimacy, and enhance the process of passing 
the critical junctures (Vohora et al., 2004).  
 
Timely information about the technology 
landscape can permit USOs to adjust the 
product development more effectively (Elfring 
& Hulsink, 2003). We can draw parallels with 
Burt’s (2000) research. By bridging clusters, 
USOs get access to information, which again 
can be used to find a suitable area of purpose 
for their product. Gübeli and Doloreux (2005) 
found that the collaboration between USOs 
and both the parental institution and external 
actors is important. During the spin-off 
process, the parental institution plays a pivotal 
role for the USOs, helping them to shape a 
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business idea. They also support USOs with 
expertise and infrastructure. However, as the 
spin-off evolves, connections towards local 
companies, financial organisations and science 
parks/incubators, become more important 
(Gübeli & Doloreux, 2005). 
 
Methodology 
Research on USOs is a relatively new field, with 
a small group of authors with highly cited 
work. We first assessed central literature 
reviews. Mustar et al. (2006), Djokovic and 
Souitaris (2008), O'Shea et al. (2004) and 
Rothaermel et al. (2007) were 
recommendations from entrepreneurship 
scholars at NTNU, and thus we started with 
these. They provided insights into key 
definitions, concepts and terms used, thus 
facilitated our empirical search. We compiled a 
list of keywords for possible search 
combinations, presented in Table 3.  
 
Scholars often restrict their literature search to 
recognized journals. As our research area is 
still in an embryonic stage (Rasmussen, 
Bulanova, Jensen, & Clausen, 2012), we did not 
want to restrict our already narrow search 
further, hence no restrictions regarding 
journals were applied. The search in the ISI 
Web of Science was conducted by using the 
keywords listed below. The ISI database covers 
leading journals, and it was therefore unlikely 
that leading articles would be left out of the 
search. The search was done in two stages. 
Stage one grasped the main substance of the 
literature, while stage two adjusted for the 
desired perspective. 
 
Table 3. Base search 
Origin Nature of the firm 
Academic 
Faculty 
Research-based 
Science-based 
Scientist 
University 
New venture 
New ventures 
Spin-off 
Spin-offs 
Spin-out 
Spin-outs 
Spinoff 
Spinoffs 
Spinout 
Spinouts 
New firm 
New firms 
Entrepreneurial 
Entrepreneurship 
Start up 
Start ups 
Spinning out 
Stage 1: We were interested in literature 
where USOs were the object of study, but given 
the many different terms used, we decided to 
make the “funnel” sufficiently big. This was 
done to make sure no relevant literature would 
be missed. We also added a column with 
keywords suited for our research scope. The 
keywords in this column were a result of a 
review of the four central articles mentioned 
earlier. We conducted our first search by using 
topic (keywords, abstract, title) for the 
keywords in table 3 and table 4. 
 
Table 4. First stage, network specific search 
Third column - Primary search (419) 
Network 
Networks 
Social Capital 
Resource-based 
Collective goals 
Reciprocity 
Interorganizational 
Interorganisational 
Intellectual capital 
Sharing 
 
To get the most topical literature, we limited 
our search from year 2000 until today. The 
combination of 6 terms for origin, 17 terms for 
the nature of the firm and 9 terms related to 
network compiled 419 articles that matched 
the search criteria. We then manually checked 
each article by reading the abstracts. 
 
Stage 2: We suspected that our search criteria 
was to narrow. We therefore conducted a 
second search with new keywords, to see if it 
would give us a substantially higher number of 
articles. The terms used are listed in Table 5 
below.  
 
Table 5. Second stage, network specific search 
Third column - Secondary search (488) 
Network 
Social 
Ties 
 
Surprisingly the search only resulted in 488 
articles. We crosschecked all articles to compile 
a full list.  An additional 175 articles were 
added.  To crosscheck our findings, we 
combined the two searches for future research, 
and the search resulted in 594 articles, as 
predicted. 
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Table 6. Combined search 
Third column - Combined search (594) 
Network 
Networks 
Social Capital 
Resource-based 
Collective goals 
Reciprocity 
Interorganizational 
Interorganisational 
Intellectual capital 
Sharing 
Social 
Ties 
 
To extract the articles that touched upon USOs 
in combination with network theory, we 
manually checked each article by reading 
abstracts. The abstracts gave us enough insight 
to sort the articles after their relevance for our 
research. The labels “not relevant”, “potential” 
and “relevant” where used in this process. In 
the selection process, we mainly focused on 
four factors to discard articles. 
 
Unit of analysis: Many articles focused on a 
different level of analysis, mainly technology 
transfer offices and incubator/science parks. 
We wanted articles with firm emergence and 
performance as level of analysis. 
Time perspective: Some articles investigated 
the relationship between a founder’s social 
capital and the probability of starting a USO  
Network focus: We focus on the benefits 
obtained from a network, while some articles 
looked at the process of gaining social capital 
Outside our definition: Articles with a 
focus on firms that did not fit our definition of 
USOs were discarded. 
 
Given the subjective method used to discard 
articles, we read the articles separately and 
compared our choice to minimize this 
subjectivity. After reading through the 594 
abstracts and discussing our evaluation, we 
ended up with 45 articles labelled as relevant 
and 46 as potential. The remaining 503 articles 
were discarded. The relevant articles were read 
carefully. Of these, only 13 were assessed as 
relevant articles for our study. During our 
initial screening we did not possess sufficient 
knowledge, and chose to include questionable 
articles, in fear of discarding potentially 
relevant articles. However, after revisiting the 
articles, we choose to discard a total of 22. We 
then assessed the 46 “potential” articles, and of 
these we included 4 articles to the relevant-
folder.  
 
The Journal of Technology Transfer was not 
included in the ISI Web of knowledge until the 
end of 2008. To reassure we did not miss any 
relevant articles from this journal, we manually 
checked the journal from volume 25 (march 
2000) to volume 33 (december 2008). From 
this search we conducted an additional three 
articles, giving us a data sample to 20 articles. 
 
 
Figure 3. Funnel illustrating the systematic search 
 
We created a database of the relevant articles, 
as shown in Table 8. It allowed us to reveal 
patterns that we discuss in the analysis 
subsequently. We then revisit the articles with 
an attempt to answer our research questions. 
This is being discussed in the section 
Discussion. 
 
There are several limitations with our method. 
Regarding our time span, this clearly discards 
relevant articles published prior to 2000. 
Although this is a major limitation, we focused 
on reading relevant “state-of-the-art” articles. 
Further, we only used ISI Web of Knowledge, 
and did not include other databases as sources 
for our search. A third limitation is the 
subjectivity, mentioned earlier. We review 
articles based on our immediate impression of 
the abstract, and also conducted our keywords 
based on other scholars subjective keywords. 
By doing so, we excluded articles that did not 
contain our qualifying search terms. Because of 
this, we may have missed relevant literature 
that uses other terms to describe the 
phenomenon. Given our low hit rate of only 13 
of 503 relevant articles, we may have discarded 
a few relevant articles. Another grand 
limitation to our method is the fact that we 
only included USO/RBSO literature. There are 
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obviously articles outside this research sphere 
that touch upon relevant insight from both 
general entrepreneurship and network-related 
research. These articles are ignored.  
 
Results 
Our extensive search reveals a total of 20 
articles, published between year 2000 and 
2013.  Further examination of the year of 
publication, shows an increasing trend in 
publications in this field of research. 
 
 
Figure 4. Overview of published articles by year (with 
trend line) 
 
The increase in numbers of articles regarding 
university entrepreneurship, has been 
observed by several scholars (Rothaermel et 
al., 2007). Rasmussen (2012) explained the 
increase in articles as a direct result of several 
special issues, published during the last years. 
However, looking at our sample, special issues 
are not the main driver for this increase, and it 
tells us that the spin-off literature is vibrant 
(Djokovic & Souitaris, 2008). 
 
Our sample consists of a fairly scattered map of 
journals. A total of 15 journals for only 20 
articles might tell us that we have found a topic 
that has not yet been embraced by specific 
areas within the research field. Network 
literature is well concentrated in highly ranked 
journals, but in the context of USOs there 
seems to be less published articles. From Table 
7, we see that Journal of Technology Transfer 
contributes with most articles in our sample. 
The journal is the second most relevant in 
Rothaermel et al.’s (2007) paper, and thus 
gives our sample validity. We also acknowledge 
that our search, by only including USOs, is 
quite restricted. This makes our sample too 
small (N=20) to make statistically solid 
statements. 
 
In assessing the journals, we have taken use of 
two well-known metrics, namely Impact Factor 
and SJR. Impact Factor is an un-weighted 
measure which reflects the average number of 
citations for the most recent articles in the 
journals, and are related exclusively to the 
search engine ISI (Garfield, 2006). It is mostly 
used as a proxy to assess the relative 
importance of journals within a field of 
research. The SJR-indicator is exclusively 
related to Scopus’ search engine, and is a 
measure of the scientific influence of the 
journals. SJR is a weighted measure, which 
accounts for both the number of citations and 
the prestige of the source journals for the last 
three years. 
 
        
 Table 7. Journal overview with metrics 
Journals: 15 # of Articles SJR Impact 
factor 
Journal of Technology Transfer 3 1,36 1,692 
Journal of Management Studies 2 2,995 3,799 
Technovation 2 1,683 3,177 
R & D Management 2 1,45 1,58 
Small business Economics 2 1,32 1,13 
Research Policy 1 2,458 2,85 
Strategic Management Journal 1 5,613 3,367 
Journal of Business Venturing 1 2,774 2,976 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 1 2,12 2,242 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 1 1,31 2,106 
Management Science 1 2,902 1,859 
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We observe that our sample of journals is very 
diverse. Journal of Management Studies, 
Strategic Management Journal, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, and 
Management Science are all high quality 
journals with significant journal metrics. 
Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale 
Geografie and Innovation - The European 
Journal of Social Science Research stand out 
as the two journals with the lowest metric 
scores. It is also noticeable that the articles 
from these two journals are written by the 
same authors. 
 
Although no journals stand out as publisher of 
more than three articles, the presence of these 
relevant actors gives validity to our sample. 
Technovation, Journal of Business Venturing, 
Research Policy and R & D Management are 
top journals within the field of USOs 
(Rasmussen et al., 2012), and by using the 
taxonomy of university entrepreneurship by 
Rothaermel et al. (2007) as a comparison, we 
see that all of our most contributing journals 
are represented. 
 
In examining the results, we also observe that 
top-publishing journals like Academic of 
Management is not present. Network research 
is also typically published in other high ranked 
journals in the sociology field, like 
Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ) or 
American Sociological Review (ASR). Neither 
of these were present in our search. This 
absence is observed and commented by many 
scholars as an indicator for the field of 
university entrepreneurship still being in an 
atheoretical embryonic development stage 
(Rothaermel et al., 2007).  
 
Several of the researchers in our sample are 
known to be frequently associated with the 
field of USO. From the Table 8 below, we can 
observe the presence of Mike Wright in four of 
the 20 articles. Mosey, Stuart, van Geenhuizen 
and Soetanto are also observed as authors in 
several articles. These journals are however, 
ranked differently. Stuart and Mosey appear in 
the journals with the higher metrics than van 
Geenhuizen and Soetanto. 
Table 8. Author/Article overview. Citations marked with -- were not indexed by either Elsevier Scopus or ISI 
Authors Year Title Citations Journals 
Lubik, S; Garnsey, 
E; Minshall, T; 
Platts, K 
2013 Value creation from the innovation 
environment: partnership strategies 
in university spin-outs 
0 R & D MANAGEMENT 
Hirai, Y; Watanabe, 
T; Inuzuka, A 
2013 Empirical analysis of the effect of 
Japanese university spinoffs' social 
networks on their performance 
0 TECHNOLOGICAL 
FORECASTING AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 
van Geenhuizen, M; 
Soetanto, DP 
2012 Open innovation among university 
spin-off firms: what is in it for them, 
and what can cities do? 
0 INNOVATION-THE EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
RESEARCH 
Rasmussen, E; 
Mosey, S; Wright, M 
2011 The Evolution of Entrepreneurial 
Competencies: A Longitudinal Study 
of University Spin-Off Venture 
Emergence 
18 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 
STUDIES 
Sullivan, DM; 
Marvel, MR 
2011 Knowledge Acquisition, Network 
Reliance, and Early-Stage 
Technology Venture Outcomes 
10 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 
STUDIES 
Walter, A; 
Parboteeah, KP; 
Riesenhuber, F; 
Hoegl, M 
2011 Championship Behaviours and 
Innovations Success: An Empirical 
Investigation of University Spin-
Offs 
3 JOURNAL OF PRODUCT 
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 
Taheri, M; van 
Geenhuizen, M 
2011 How human capital and social 
networks may influence the patterns 
of international learning among 
academic spin-off firms* 
3 PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCIENCE 
Gurdon, MA; 
Samsom, KJ 
2010 A longitudinal study of success and 
failure among scientist-started 
ventures 
3 TECHNOVATION 
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Soetanto, DP; van 
Geenhuizen, M 
2010 Social capital through networks: 
The case of university spin-off firms 
in different stages 
3 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
ECONOMISCHE EN SOCIALE 
GEOGRAFIE 
Chen, MH; Wang, 
MC 
2008 Social networks and a new venture's 
innovative capability: the role of 
trust within entrepreneurial teams 
11 R & D MANAGEMENT 
Mosey, S; Wright, M 2007 From human capital to social 
capital: A longitudinal study of 
technology-based academic 
entrepreneurs 
60 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 
Walter, A; Auer, M; 
Ritter, T 
2006 The impact of network capabilities 
and entrepreneurial orientation on 
university spin-off performance 
82 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 
VENTURING 
Johansson, M; 
Jacob, M; 
Hellström, T; 
 
2005 How and why do research-based 
start-ups differ at founding? A 
resource-based configurational 
perspective. 
-- THE JOURNAL OF 
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 
Vohora, A; Wright, 
M; Lockett, A 
2004 Critical junctures in the 
development of university high-tech 
spinout companies 
142 RESEARCH POLICY 
Heirman, A; 
Clarysse, B; 
2004 Questionnaire of 99 RBSU's from 
Flanders. 
-- THE JOURNAL OF 
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 
Druilhe, C; Garnsey, 
E; 
2004 Do academic spin-outs differ and 
does it matter? 
-- THE JOURNAL OF 
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 
Perez, MP; Sanchez, 
AM 
2003 The development of university spin-
offs: early dynamics of technology 
transfer and networking 
42 TECHNOVATION 
Grandi, A; Grimaldi, 
R 
2003 Exploring the networking 
characteristics of new venture 
founding teams 
29 SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS 
Shane, S; Stuart, T 2002 Organizational endowments and the 
performance of university start-ups 
280 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 
Lee, C; Lee, K; 
Pennings, JM 
2001 Internal capabilities, external 
networks, and performance: A study 
on technology-based ventures 
322 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
JOURNAL 
 
Articles 
We will in this section briefly present the 
articles, and further elaborate on the findings 
in the Discussion chapter. The literature from 
our search comprises several different 
perspectives towards network theory. Building 
on our earlier categorisation of the social 
capital elements, we synthesize our findings 
into network structure, network governance 
and network content, introduced by Hoang 
and Antoncic (2003). These three elements 
explain the impact network has on USOs. As 
access to specific resources are commonly 
mentioned in the literature, we will put extra 
emphasis on network content and the 
underlying constructs this category comprises. 
Brush et al.’s (2001) resource categories will be 
used as a framework to present the findings 
regarding the attaining of the different 
resources. 
 
The network elements are intertwined and not 
mutually exclusive. A focus on one network 
element does not discard the others. We have 
done a subjective assessment, where the 
articles have been reviewed by the authors 
separately, concluding with a discussion about 
the relevance. The goal of these discussions 
was to separate the articles into the different 
perspectives. The most relevant drivers for the 
separation of the articles were the research 
question(s) and the finding(s). Many articles 
did discuss all the elements, but often with a 
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specific scope towards one of them. Articles 
with a focus on the differences in the structural 
position and strength of ties were consequently 
put under network structure, articles 
investigating of the mechanisms that facilitate 
transfer of network content were put under 
governance, and the articles that looks at the 
benefits of having a network were placed under 
content. 
 
In addition to the articles in our data sample, 
we found four literature reviews in our search, 
being Djokovic and Souitaris (2008), Mustar et 
al. (2006), Rothaermel et al. (2007) and Stuart 
and Sorenson (2007). These were used to 
crosscheck our sample. 
 
Network structure: The social structures 
and their impact on USOs are being addressed 
in six articles, where the main focus lies on the 
strength of ties and the structural position in 
the network. The articles find different effects 
regarding which benefits that are offered with 
different structures. The main findings are that 
non-redundant ties offer timely information, in 
accordance with Burt’s (Burt, 2000) theories, 
and that strong ties are crucial during founding 
phase to overcome initial disadvantages (Shane 
& Cable, 2002). 
 
While the articles focus on how different 
network structures affect USOs, some do also 
shed light on the governance- and content 
perspectives. Mosey and Wright (2007) discuss 
the nature of the resources and the governance 
mechanisms utilized, and hence could be 
placed under network governance as well. 
 
Table 9. Article overview - Structure 
Authors Research question(s) Data Key finding(s) 
Johansson et 
al. (2005) 
What are the antecedent conditions and 
the reasons for further relations between 
universities and USOs, and how are they 
sustained? 
Case study of 
four USOs. 
It is often researchers initiative to spin out 
firms, where personal interest is the main factor. 
USOs are highly dependent on a sustainable link 
to university research, and are constituted by a 
few strong ties towards home department, and 
weak ties to other universities. 
Geenhuizen 
and Soetanto 
(2012) 
How do USOs use network in gaining 
needed resources, and how does it affect 
the performance. 
59 spin offs 
from Delft. 
Spin-offs engaged in high-density (or closed) 
networks and strong ties show a relatively large 
propensity for weak growth, whereas spin-offs 
engaged with strongly heterogeneous partners 
and with networks outside the city-region show 
a relatively large propensity for strong growth. 
Taheri and 
Geenhuizen 
(2011) 
What influences the building of 
international networks. 
100 USOs 
from 
Trondheim 
and Delft. 
Firms in loose social networks were more likely 
to establish international relations, given a 
larger and more diverse access to resource 
opportunities for firms in network brokerage 
positions. 
Mosey and 
Wright 
(2007) 
What is the nature of the resources 
gained through the social networks of 
academic entrepreneurs with different 
levels of prior ownership experience in 
the early stages of venture development, 
and what governance mechanisms are 
utilized by academic entrepreneurs with 
different experience to access resources 
through social networks at the early 
stages. 
Multiple case 
study, with 
interviews of 
24 academics 
with variance 
in terms of 
business 
experience. 
Habitual entrepreneurs are more likely to gain 
credibility and hence raise equity easier, gain 
management resources outside their research 
environment and gain technical resources from 
their research colleagues. 
Hirai et al. 
(2013) 
Empirically examines the effect of 
university spinoffs' external advice 
networks on their performance. 
79 Japanese 
university 
spin-offs. 
Non-redundancy in university spinoffs' 
networks affects their performance positively, 
and the impact is enhanced by the tie closeness 
of business relationships and the tie weakness of 
private relationships. 
Shane and 
Stuart (2002) 
How do resource endowments affect the 
likelihood of attracting venture capital 
financing, experience IPO and fail. 
134 MIT 
USOs. 
The presence of direct and indirect ties to 
venture investors prior to firm founding sharply 
decreases the likelihood of failure, and increases 
the likelihood of external funding. Social capital, 
because of the impact on fund-raising, has long-
term positive influence on the performance of 
new ventures. 
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Network governance: Only two articles 
focus on network governance, where the 
mechanisms that are coordinating and 
facilitating the exchange of resources are 
being addressed. Weak ties tend to facilitate 
one-time economic exchange governed by 
legal mechanisms, whereas strong ties tend 
to facilitate on-going exchanges governed by 
mutual trust (Newbert, Tornikoski, & 
Quigley, 2013). Such mechanisms can reduce 
transaction costs connected with for example 
monitoring, and thus creating cost 
advantages. Perez and Sanchez (2003) 
investigate how active USOs are in network 
development and technology transfer to 
overcome initial disadvantages. These 
disadvantages comprises more than just 
credibility and trust, hence this article could 
also be placed within the structural- or 
content-oriented view.  
 
Table 10. Article overview - Governance 
Authors Research question(s) Data Key finding(s) 
Perez and 
Sanchez 
(2003) 
How active in the network development 
and technology transfer are university 
spin-offs during their early years to 
overcome initial disadvantages, and is 
there any relationship between early 
networks, knowledge creation and 
technology transfer in university spin-
offs? 
10 Spanish 
University 
spin-off 
companies 
from 1990-
2000. 
The technology transfer with the university and 
the USO is decreasing after their early years, 
while the relationship with customers 
increases. Links throughout the regional 
innovation network helped the firms to 
overcome trust barriers and increase the flow of 
technology transfer after their early years. 
Rasmussen 
et al. (2011) 
How do new ventures in the university 
context emerge, and how is credibility 
reached by acquisition and development 
of the entrepreneurial competencies? 
4 university 
spin offs from 
UK and 
Norway. 
Nascent USOs are more likely to gain credibility 
if they can evolve the venture’s leveraging 
competency through interaction of the 
entrepreneurial team, containing prior 
entrepreneurial experience, with external 
resource providers. It is also critical to have a 
strong leadership role to sustain the venture 
start-up process. 
 
Network content: Several articles (12) 
focus on the benefits obtained from network 
ties. USOs are continuously building their 
resource base, and access to external 
resources is vital. However, it is not only 
resources that are being obtained by USOs. 
Strategically good advices during the 
founding process are invaluable, and may 
easily be the determinant that separates 
USOs from success and failure. Legitimacy is 
also an important benefit, helping USOs to 
pass the credibility threshold easier. 
 
Table 11. Article overview - Content 
Authors Research question(s) Data Key finding(s) 
Walter et al. 
(2006) 
Network capabilities are positively 
associated with spin-off performance. 
Questionnaires 
from 149 
founders of 
spin-offs. 
The study shows that the performance 
variables sales growth, sales per employee, 
profit attainment, perceived customer 
relationship quality, realized competitive 
advantages, and long-term survival, are 
influenced by a spin-off’s network. 
Lee et al. 
(2001) 
This study examined the influence of 
internal capabilities and external 
networks on firm performance. 
137 Korean 
start-ups. 
There are three indicators of internal 
capabilities that are important predictors of a 
start-up’s performance. Among external 
networks, only the linkages to venture capital 
companies predicted the start-up’s 
performance. 
Grandi and 
Grimaldi 
(2005) 
What are the founding teams’ intention to 
set up relations with external agents and 
their frequency of interaction with 
external agents. 
40 Italian 
academic spin-
offs. 
Articulation of roles positively affects the 
intention to set up relations with external 
agents. Academic entrepreneurs their own 
“ties” and their interaction modalities with 
external agents, so they are likely to keep 
interacting with the same frequency (or even 
more, given the different nature of the new 
business) with external agents after the 
establishment of the new company. 
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Lubik et al. 
(2013) 
How relationships with each type of 
partner can be leveraged to help the firm 
create value. 
7 case studies 
of Advanced 
Material USOs. 
The most commercially successful USOs in the 
advanced materials industry were forming 
alliances with a number of corporate partners, 
limiting their dependence on a single partner, 
in addition to a wide range of organizations 
including nonparent universities and other 
USOs. 
Chen and 
Wang 
(2008) 
This paper examines the effects of social 
networks and trust on a new venture’s 
innovative capability. 
112 technology-
based 
entrepreneurial 
teams from 
Taiwan. 
Both internal and external social networks 
have marginally positive impacts on a new 
venture’s innovative capability, and trust 
within the entrepreneurial teams is found to be 
important for the relationship between 
external social networks and innovative 
capability. 
Soetanto 
and 
Geenhuizen 
(2010) 
Explores differences in social networks 
between two development stages and to 
estimate the influence of network 
characteristics on growth in these stages. 
150 USOs from 
Delft and 
NTNU. 
Early stage spin-offs tend to employ networks 
dominated by tightness, strong relationships, 
more homogeneous partners and local 
partners, whereas networks of spin-offs in later 
stages tend to face clearly contrasting features. 
Heirman 
and Clarysse 
(2004) 
This paper studies the initial resources on 
which new organizations are based and 
how these resources interact with the 
institutional origin and market 
characteristics. 
Questionnaire 
of 99 RBSU's 
from Flanders. 
The initial resources of the firm affect the 
firms’ further development. 
Walter et al. 
(2011) 
Does champion behaviour result in 
innovation success? A longitudinal 
measure of sales growth. 
123 USOs. The results indicate that network building has 
the desired positive relationship with sales 
performance. Surprisingly, pursuing 
innovative ideas are not related to sales 
growth. 
Vohora et al. 
(2004) 
This paper investigates the development 
of university spinout companies (USOs). 
7 USOs from 
UK. 
Identified that the growth of high-tech 
ventures is characterized by a number of 
distinct stages of development, termed “critical 
junctures”. Networks with strong ties and 
relations with respected actors may help on 
passing junctures regarding credibility. 
Sullivan and 
Marvel 
(2011) 
Do entrepreneurs with reliance on 
networking for acquiring technology- and 
market knowledge benefit from it? 
Surveys from 
151 spin-offs. 
For spin-offs at high levels of technology 
knowledge acquisition, entrepreneurs who rely 
more on networks benefit in terms of 
producing more innovative offerings. 
Entrepreneurs who relied more on network 
ties for acquiring market knowledge were not 
able to utilize their marked knowledge more 
effectively to generate higher first-year sales. 
Gurdon and 
Samsom 
(2010) 
What are the drivers of success and failure 
for USOs? 
Interviews of 
22 USO 
founders 
The technological resources combined with the 
financial capabilities were regarded as the 
drivers of success. 
Druilhe and 
Garnsey 
(2004) 
Do Academic Spin-Outs Differ and Does it 
Matter? 
Case studies of 
9 firms 
originating 
from 
Cambridge 
RBSU's differ in both firms resources and 
entrepreneurs knowledge/experience. The 
continuous improvement on the entrepreneurs 
perception of opportunities is helping the firm 
gaining a better understanding of the resource 
configurations required to pursue the refined 
or newly perceived opportunities.  
 
We have structured the findings on resource 
acquisition based on Brush et al.’s (2001) 
categories: 
 
Financial resources: Many of the findings in 
the articles are pointing towards the financial 
effects that are being offered from an external 
network. Direct and indirect ties towards 
venture investors, prior to firm founding, are 
important, as this sharply decreases the 
likelihood of failure (Shane & Stuart, 2002). 
This also concurs with Tyebjee and Bruno 
(1984), who argues that VC-funds use 
references gathered from their own network in 
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the process of screening the potential firms. 
The nature of financial resources, defined by 
Brush et al (2001) as an instrumental resource, 
make them suitable for acquiring other 
resources. Heirman and Clarysse (2004) point 
to the connection between financial and 
human resources, and how more of one 
resource leads to a higher probability of 
acquiring the other, also concurring with 
Shane and Stuart’s (2002) findings. Having 
direct ties towards venture investors at 
founding, strongly help USOs gain financial 
resources (Shane & Stuart, 2002). This further 
puts them in a position where they can acquire 
other valuable resources, to create competitive 
advantages.  
 
Human resources: Many articles highlight how 
USOs with a loose network are more likely to 
gain management resources outside their 
research environment (Mosey & Wright, 
2007). Chen and Wang (2008) highlight the 
impact network has on innovative capabilities. 
With ties connected to talent and management 
resources, the USO will have the ability to 
create high performing human resources. The 
credibility of the USO, deriving from the 
university it was spun out from, also affect the 
attractiveness towards talented employees and 
can play a role in retrieving the desired human 
resources (Grandi & Grimaldi, 2003). 
Knowledge acquisition is a theme in many of 
the articles, and a heterogeneous network 
makes it easier to attract talent and 
management resources. Hence USOs with a 
narrow network are often limited to the human 
resources their research environment offers 
and are thus in need of access to resources 
from industry partners and external investors. 
We also note that attracting and obtaining 
human resources, and not so much the 
implications of it, is a typical theme in the 
literature. This is not surprising, given that we 
investigate the network effects, and not the 
human resource effect. 
 
Technological resources: Firm-specific 
products and technologies are important for 
USOs, as they constitute a part of the USO’s 
core competency. Strong technological 
resources can create a competitive advantage 
vis-á-vis rivals (Brush et al., 2001). Habitual 
entrepreneurs are more likely to gain access to 
technology resources matching their 
knowledge (Mosey & Wright, 2007). By having 
a structurally position with indirect ties, the 
possibility of identifying a technology that 
matches your USO increases (Druilhe & 
Garnsey, 2004; Mosey & Wright, 2007). A non-
redundant network gives them access to a 
wider range of resources, and makes it easier to 
identify available technologies appropriate for 
their use. Lubik et al. (2013) point on how 
academic institutions and other USOs are 
valuable sources of complementary resources 
and innovations. Thus, external innovations 
can be a compliment for the USO’s 
technological resources. Gathering 
technological resources mainly consists of 
searching for the right resource. There might 
be many “try-and-fails” before right match is 
found, thus the amount of information is 
important. 
 
Physical resources: Very little of the literature 
we have sought out comprises findings 
regarding physical resources. These resources 
are tangible and easy to measure. However, we 
see the immense diversity of how these 
resources exist for the different firms. The fact 
that these resources possess value to the 
holding firm relevant to their utility 
complicates the matter of measuring. The value 
of the resources will vary, depending on the 
actor obtaining them, and we therefore note 
that this might influence the attractiveness as a 
research subject. Firms, based on Information 
Technology and other software, are increasing 
in amount. The physical resources needed in 
these firms, are normally not too important, 
compared to more traditional, industrial firms, 
and thus we can comprehend the low 
attendance of this subject. However, we convey 
that there is still a strong link between the 
network and the availability of physical 
resources for USOs. For faculty and students, 
strong ties to the university can give access to 
laboratories and other equipment. This is a 
major benefit for USOs, compared to other 
start-ups. In the case of external network with 
other firms, the USO can increase their 
availability to physical resources by sharing the 
cost of facilities, tools and machines.  
Discussion 
Our paper missions to investigate the benefits 
obtained by USOs as an effect of their network, 
and the characteristics these networks possess. 
The articles in our sample address both USOs 
and single entrepreneurs. Firstly, we look at 
the differences between these classifications, to 
see if similarities can be drawn. Future 
researchers may benefit by generalizations 
made by possible differences. Secondly, we 
present our findings concerning research 
question 1, namely what the main benefits of 
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being connected to a network for USOs are. 
Thirdly, we sought to answer research question 
2, being what network characteristics 
constitute these benefits. We build on social 
capital theory to investigate our findings, by 
looking at the structural position the USO 
possess. Lastly, we present a model based on 
our findings, and introduce two propositions. 
 
USOs or academic 
entrepreneurs? 
We discovered that a large part of the literature 
either used USOs or academic entrepreneurs as 
the focal object. The differences found in our 
sample were investigated, to see if similarities 
could be drawn. If research on entrepreneurs 
harvests the same results as research on USOs, 
operationalizations can be made. Earlier 
research methods on single entrepreneurs may 
then be used for USOs. 
 
When addressing single entrepreneurs, our 
findings point to trust mechanisms as the main 
mechanism that governs exchange of benefits 
most effectively. In opposition to established 
firms, entrepreneurs predominantly use 
informal “open-ended” contracts in their 
networks. Mosey and Wright (2007) 
discovered how the difference in experience 
affect the governance mechanisms of the 
entrepreneurs’ network, and how this affected 
venture development. Habitual entrepreneurs 
are strategic regarding the new ties they wish 
to build. By actively trying to fill the gaps they 
discover, they build a loose network of ties to 
people in various positions in different 
industries. The structural holes (Burt, 2000) 
are easier bridged, and valuable benefits can be 
obtained. Rasmussen et al. (2011) further finds 
that habitual entrepreneurs possess 
competencies regarding how to access industry 
partners and investors. But are these findings 
transferrable to USOs? 
 
Entrepreneurship is a process and not an event 
(Aldrich Howard & Ruef, 2006). Stuart and 
Sorenson (2007) shed light to the little theory 
that exists regarding the distinctions between 
founders and firms in the entrepreneurial 
network effects field. USOs are legal entities 
with self-developed culture, routines and 
processes that persist independently of 
individual employees. However, much of the 
research presented in this paper elaborates on 
how interpersonal interactions have an effect 
on the USOs. Firms do not feel sentiments of 
trust and obligation. This implies that the 
research must point to how the entrepreneurs 
themselves should govern their networks with 
trust. However, USOs do have status (Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2007), and this status can serve as a 
foundation of legitimacy, which can support 
the formation of networks and resources 
(Shane & Stuart, 2002). Hence, the initial 
social capital possessed by USOs is in fact the 
social capital of the founders. This capital is 
being transferred to the firm when it develops 
internal processes and capabilities. This builds 
on RVT logic, where the initial resources of the 
firm over time are becoming embedded within 
the firm context. The question regarding when 
the USOs’ status becomes independent from its 
founders is thus of interest. When researchers 
are able to measure firms’ networks, the 
networks become properties of the firms 
(Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). In the less frequent 
instances in which the researcher only has 
information on founders, the founders’ ties 
become the units of measurement, even though 
outcomes typically occur at the firm level 
(Shane & Cable, 2002). Using these 
contentions one would expect that the findings 
for newly established USOs and academic 
entrepreneurs should yield the same results.  
 
The benefits present in USOs’ 
network 
The benefits touched upon in our sample 
constitute access to resources, legitimacy, 
information, and advice. These construct are 
not completely different. It can be argued that 
information and advice are understood as 
similar types of benefits. Information can also 
be understood as knowledge, and as Brush et 
al. (2001) argue, knowledge is a part of human 
resources. Nevertheless, they may be separated 
in the following way: Access to resources is a 
benefit that enables USOs to acquire the 
resources needed at a specific time, legitimacy 
is the reputation USOs gain by being connected 
to prestigious actors, information lets USOs 
identify available opportunities and potential 
threats, while advice guides USOs in strategic 
decisions. We will first review our findings on 
access to resources, and then elaborate on the 
other benefits in the respective order. 
 
The most frequently mentioned benefits in 
regards to resources available through network 
ties are increased probability of VC-funding 
and access to investors (Lee et al., 2001; Shane 
& Stuart, 2002; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). USOs 
often have a resource-demanding technology 
(Shane & Stuart, 2002), and the availability of 
 19 
financial resources is especially important. 
With financial resources, USOs can faster put 
their products to market. In addition, financial 
resources are viewed as instrumental - suitable 
for acquiring other resources (Brush et al., 
2001). Management resources available 
through network ties is another benefit 
highlighted in our sample (Mosey & Wright, 
2007). Surprisingly, little of the literature 
focused on the physical resources, obtained 
through network ties. Initially, we thought this 
would be a well-covered subject, as it is 
relevant and easy to comprehend. However, 
this could be explained by the fact that 
financial resources are instrumental (Brush et 
al., 2001). Physical resources can be bought 
with financial resources, and are hence not that 
interesting to investigate. Also, physical 
resources are often dependent on the different 
USOs, making it challenging to generalize. 
Nevertheless, most of the literature concurs 
that it is critical with resources from partners 
to take the innovations to market, given their 
small size, weak market recognition and lack of 
legitimacy.  
 
Many of our findings point to the reputational 
effect of being connected to external actors. In 
general, USOs gain legitimacy because of their 
tie to academic institution (Walter, Auer, & 
Ritter, 2006). They normally consist of 
researchers, with unproven technology and a 
high value – high risk potential. USOs are 
dependent on legitimacy towards external 
actors to gain network benefits.  Corporate 
spin-offs however, can enjoy resource 
endowments from their parent companies, and 
may not be that dependent on credibility to 
attain critical resources. Further, Heirman and 
Clarysse (2004) found that academic spin-offs 
are able to penetrate the venture capital 
network more easily than independent start-
ups and corporate spin-offs, because of their 
connection with universities and the help from 
their affiliated TTOs. The credibility benefits 
were also highlighted by Perez and Sanchez 
(2003), suggesting that links throughout USOs 
research networks helped them overcoming 
trust barriers and flow of technology transfer, 
given their legitimacy to their parent 
institution. However, being connected to an 
academic environment might also give USOs a 
reputation of being a team of researcher, with 
no prior commercial experience. The lack of 
business experience may be a drawback for 
potential investors or partners. Nevertheless, 
the literature concurs on how legitimacy is 
beneficial for acquiring new ties, and that pre-
existing ties can offer legitimacy. For newly 
established entities, the self-promoting process 
can create cost barriers, due to scarce 
resources. Legitimacy in the market can make 
this process easier, and with a greater impact. 
Hence, the beneficial effect of having 
legitimacy is very important for new ventures, 
and especially for USOs, due to their 
abovementioned characteristics. 
 
A third benefit found to be provided by 
networks is timely information. An initial 
barrier for USOs is a lack of opportunity 
identification knowledge (Vohora et al., 2004). 
They do normally not possess information 
channels, and have to rely on their network ties 
to provide timely information. Information is a 
benefit that makes it easier to identify available 
technologies and opportunities appropriate for 
their use (Mosey & Wright, 2007). This can 
lower the costs connected to the search for this 
information. Mosey and Wright (2007) found 
that habitual entrepreneurs highly valued their 
ties to the providers of industry knowledge, 
business development knowledge, and 
technical knowledge. They were seen to build 
new ties with researchers to identify new 
opportunities and match technologies to their 
knowledge of industry needs. A big pool of 
potential opportunities equips USOs with a 
variety of choices, and helps them take 
strategically better decisions than their rivals. 
The network reduces the vertical integration 
and scanning costs (Coleman, 1990) and help 
USOs to access the strategic information and 
opportunities. The scanning costs are 
associated with the costs for obtaining 
information, and without a beneficial network, 
USOs have to personally collect this cost. By 
being provided with this information through 
networks, these costs are reduced.  
 
The access to advice was touched lightly upon 
in our sample, and constitutes the fourth 
benefit. Advice may be seen as guided 
information regarding a distinct topic. Advice 
does not have to come upon request, and thus 
the receiver often evaluates advice differently 
regarding the person it comes from. Academic 
entrepreneurs are found to rate their research 
colleagues consistently high in the ability of 
providing advice, guidance and access to new 
technological knowledge (Mosey & Wright, 
2007). By contrast, the same entrepreneurs 
were less positive regarding the advice they 
received from regional business advisors and 
consistently negative regarding their 
interactions with providers of equity finance. 
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Hence, entrepreneurs view the advices gained 
from their colleagues higher than advices from 
external actors. The value of advice can 
sometimes be assessed by the opportunity 
costs, relative to buying a similar service. By 
building effective relationships with TTOs, 
USOs can gain access to legal- and 
commercialization advices (Mosey & Wright, 
2007). However, it was found that habitual 
entrepreneurs replaced TTOs with professional 
legal advisors, to be able to negotiate deals on 
their own terms. This may contend that the 
relationship with TTOs is not entirely governed 
by trust. Westphal (1999) found that firms with 
boards consisting of ties to strategically related 
organizations were able to provide the firms 
with better advice and counsel, and hence 
supporting Mosey and Wright’s (2007) 
findings. Advices can turn out to be invaluable 
as they may affect large, strategic decisions for 
the firm, contributing to better performance.  
 
Network characteristics 
constituting benefits 
A structural position in a network determines 
to what extent one can obtain and take 
advantage of the benefits mentioned above. 
Most of the literature in our sample comprises 
how non-redundant networks are beneficial in 
regards to structural holes (Hirai, Watanabe, & 
Inuzuka, 2013; Mosey & Wright, 2007; 
Soetanto & van Geenhuizen, 2010). High-
density networks show a relatively large 
propensity for weak organisational growth 
(Soetanto & van Geenhuizen, 2010), which 
might indicate that the presence of a loose 
network is important for USOs. Hence, the 
ability to bridge structural holes is a key aspect 
for USOs (Burt, 2000).  This aspect is 
important for other start-ups as well. However, 
as USOs are small in size, have weak market 
recognition and lack legitimacy (Walter et al., 
2006) it is especially critical. Hirai et al.’s 
(2013) study also found that non-redundant, 
strong ties were optimal for USOs’ external 
network. This finding breaks with 
Granovetter’s (1973) theory of strength of weak 
ties and combine Burt’s (2000) structural holes 
theory with Coleman’s (1989) network closure 
arguments. These findings argue that for 
USOs, it may be valuable to have non-
redundant connections, and that these 
connections are sufficiently strong to enhance 
the transfer of valuable information, due to the 
abovementioned characteristics. They may also 
be structured in a dense network.  This is 
typical for scientist driven USOs, where their 
network normally consists of mainly academic 
ties. This might prevent USOs from becoming 
known in the market and access potential 
external actors that could provide resources for 
future growth. Non-redundancy offers the 
informational advantage while strong ties 
promote trust and cooperation and facilitates 
the exchange of high-quality information and 
tacit knowledge (Johansson, Jacob, & 
Hellström, 2005). Johansson et al. (2005) 
argue that weak, non-redundant ties might 
provide timely, but superficial information, 
due to lack of trust and support. Shane and 
Stuart (2002) also argue on the importance of 
having pre-established strong ties to external 
actors. They found a staggering 70% lower 
chance for failure if USOs had prior strong ties 
towards venture investors. Trust can also 
create cost advantages, in comparison to 
bureaucratic mechanisms. Mutual trust allows 
both parties to assume that actions taken will 
be mutually beneficial. A relationship with an 
external partner that is governed by trust may 
affect the richness of the relationship, and offer 
more than just product exchange. 
 
Sullivan and Marvel (2011) states that USOs 
should search to use their already established 
connection in a positive cost-advantage setting. 
This continuing cooperation increases 
informality, which can build up strong ties that 
governs efficient exchange of resources. Burt’s 
(2001) theory of structural holes elaborates on 
how it is possible to borrow networks from 
other actors you have strong ties towards. 
Nascent and novice entrepreneurs are 
borrowing network from their affiliated TTOs, 
while habitual entrepreneurs with experience 
and social capital rather want to be 
independent and use their own networks 
(Mosey & Wright, 2007). Borrowed networks 
are either dense or hierarchical. The first of 
these alternatives describes a situation where 
the firm is accepted into an “inner circle” of a 
few actors, under the legitimacy of the sponsor 
tie. This is comparable to a high-density 
network which Soetanto and Geenhuizen 
(2010) linked to weak growth. A hierarchical 
network on the other hand, results from 
borrowing a network that spans structural 
holes (Burt, 2001). In these networks there are 
no “inner circle” which implicates that one is 
dependent on the sponsor to continuously 
vouch for you, hence requiring strong ties.  
 
As USOs often strive to pilot test their 
technologies in large-scale projects, connecting 
them to a single, industrial partner, they risk 
 21 
getting dependent on this actor (Lubik et al., 
2013). In addition, the partners can also gain 
access to the state-of-the-art technology the 
USO possess, and use it for their own products 
(Walter et al., 2006). However, being 
dependant on strong ties is not the only option 
for USOs. The cost associated with maintaining 
and building these strong ties must be 
contrasted with the risk of getting too 
dependent. USOs are often eager to connect to 
industrial players, to validate their technology 
and rapidly commercialise. We argue that 
there may be substantial risks connected to 
such single partnerships. By putting trust in 
one sole player, the power balance has a 
tendency to become very uneven, and the USO 
might find it hard to negotiate favourable 
terms. One way of lowering this risk is to 
engage in a wider network of weak ties 
(Johansson et al., 2005), and at a later stage 
transform these weak ties into nourishing 
strong ties. This is typically not during 
founding, but in later stages (Soetanto & van 
Geenhuizen, 2010). Lubik et al. (2013) also 
found evidence of vulnerability of relying on a 
single partner. The USOs working with several 
partners were found to have greater and more 
sustained commercial success. However, the 
main reason USOs relied on a single partner 
was due to the lack of awareness of their 
potential partners. The benefits of having 
access to timely information hence enhance 
USOs possibilities to engage in fruitful 
partnerships. By not being structurally 
positioned, USOs are more vulnerable of being 
dependent on external actors, because of the 
lack of timely information. Nevertheless, as 
Brush et al. (2001) argues, entrepreneurs must 
carefully consider the cost, timing and 
reliability of resource providers. Over- and 
underestimation of resource needs have put 
companies out of business (e.g. Momenta 
Corporation (Oviatt, McDougall, & Loper, 
1995)), thus indicating that potential partners 
must be carefully identified. Strong ties in this 
matter lower the risk of getting locked in with 
underperforming partners. 
 
Propositions 
Our understanding of the literature is that 
USOs should strive for a non-redundant 
network, characterized by strong ties and 
governed by trust. In this way, additive 
information may be extracted and necessary 
resources can be gathered early. The key 
challenges facing USOs are their institutional 
origin, as mentioned earlier. They need a non-
redundant network to span over the structural 
holes separating them from the commercial 
actors, but normally do not possess such ties. 
Figure 5 and 5 show the process USOs could 
undergo to obtain the abovementioned 
benefits. 
 
 
Figure 5. Representation of initial USO network – 
hierarchical network 
 
USOs often start with strong ties towards their 
TTOs, universities, and their research 
colleagues in general. These environments do 
normally not possess links to external market 
actors, and can constitute a dense network, 
although it is TTOs ambition is to possess such 
links. For nascent entrepreneurs, borrowing 
sponsors networks to access benefits may be 
crucial to expand from their environment. It is 
however, important that the sponsors are not 
locked in the same dense network, and are able 
to offer external benefits. If USOs are able to 
start with strong ties to several external actors 
with a non-redundant network, they can 
prevent dependency early on. In this way, the 
USO obtains benefits from their strong ties, 
gain legitimacy towards the market, and 
participate in their strong ties’ network, seen in 
Figure 5. If USOs immediately try to evolve 
their indirect ties into personal, strong ties, 
they may be able to convert their borrowed 
network into their own. This may provide 
access to valuable information and resources, 
as illustrated in figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Representation of initial USO network – 
converted network 
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A clear problem arises when the sponsors do 
not offer indirect ties that bridge the USO to 
the preferred markets. If a USO is located in 
Norway, and is interested in connecting to 
actors in the Asian market, their initial 
sponsors must be able to offer that bridge. This 
is clearly not the case for all sponsors. A 
possible method to gain access to bridging 
sponsors is to identify potential indirect ties 
that most likely are able to bridge the 
structural holes. Further, by identifying the 
relationship chain, connecting you to the 
bridging sponsors, USOs can go through each 
link and transfer it to a strong tie, hence get 
closer to their preferred sponsor. We did not 
find any support for this in our sample. 
However, through conversations with 
experienced entrepreneurs, we found that this 
method is frequently used to gain access to 
indirect ties that possess benefits. Another 
possibility is to build relationships through 
proactive contact, meetings and marketing. 
However, the literature shows that the use of 
network ties is a more cost- and time-effective 
method. Hence, to not be locked in a dense 
network, it is important to connect to sponsors 
with non-redundant networks. However, for 
USOs with a dense network it might be hard to 
find these sponsors. This leads us to our first 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: To effectively connect to a 
non-redundant network, USOs should 
establish relationships to persons with pre-
existing ties to potential sponsors. 
 
As mentioned above, it is important to connect 
to the indirect ties, to avoid dependence on 
their original sponsors. A set of pre-existing 
ties does not necessarily bridge more beneficial 
ties to the USO. This leads us to proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: To effectively localize and 
evolve beneficial ties into strong ties, USOs 
should connect with persons with networking 
capabilities and social capital. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has highlighted the effects that 
university spin-offs experience with a well-
functioned network. A network offers essential 
resources, advice, information and legitimacy, 
which translate to better performance. 
Building network ties is a vital task for USOs, 
to be able to extract the benefits connected 
with the network. Further, the paper 
investigates the characteristics of a suiting 
network for USOs at founding. A non-
redundant network can offer benefits, and help 
USOs bridge the structural holes they are faced 
with. However, to prevent superficial 
information, strong ties need to be established. 
Strong ties to certain external actors offer 
legitimacy toward the market and enhance the 
transfer of valuable information. 
 
Our findings imply that USOs need to attract 
persons with a non-redundant network, related 
to the industry, early in the founding phase to 
exploit his/her connections. It also implies that 
USOs with strong initial ties will attract 
resourceful employees to help them grow. 
Furthermore, a firm that is able to create, and 
not only use, their network can experience 
better performance than others.  
 
Limitations and further 
research 
As depicted earlier, the concept of USOs is a 
complex and complicated matter, with several 
definitions and research streams. As the 
formation of USOs is a relatively new 
phenomenon, the research on the topic is also 
somewhat embryonic (Rasmussen et al., 2012). 
The fairly scattered typology of the USO-
research landscape might indicate that not all 
the information is known yet.  To illustrate, 
there might be different “valleys”, where 
researchers use different terminology to 
address similar concepts, or even entire 
districts with similarities not known yet. In our 
empiric search we have only included 
USO/RBSO to describe our focal objects. As we 
touch upon the limitations for our method, 
there might be relevant literature and 
knowledge, directly related to USOs, which is 
not included in our methodical search. The 
implications for this potential lack of overview 
might be a slow progress in the research field, 
as researchers fail to accumulate knowledge. 
 
Our sample contains literature without 
geographical restrictions, extending from 
Japan, Europe and United States. The cultural 
context might play a central role in regards to 
the network impact. A study with a narrow 
scope would give a more precise image for our 
propositions to be tested. Further, we chose to 
look at performance as an outcome. 
Performance is a temporary term, and follows 
a pathway of causes, caused by antecedent 
events (McMullen & Dimov, 2013). A firm, in a 
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snapshot of the present, can be successful and 
showing high performance, but over a longer 
time span it actually goes bankrupt. By 
chopping up time and partitioning the 
observation space along variables, it can be 
hard to grasp what affects the different 
outcomes. Whether an action is “good” or 
“bad” is only determined by the ultimate 
outcome. The data sample we have conducted 
contains articles that do not consequently use a 
process-oriented study. Thus, findings stating 
that USOs gain a “strong performance” are 
viewing the performance from the moment the 
study was conducted. This is a limitation with 
our study. It would be interesting to do a study 
with a consistent time span or an event history 
analysis for the USOs investigated. 
 
In addition to the external limitations, there 
are internal limitations, entitled to the 
researchers and their method. In the screening 
of titles, abstracts and articles, the researchers 
have individually assessed and interpreted the 
content. The screening of this sample was done 
early in the researchers learning curve for the 
field. As conclusions are built on subjective 
assumptions, based on theoretical perspectives 
and earlier research, the researchers may not 
have known the entirety of the field. Hence, 
there are some risks of literature being 
misinterpreted and thus discarded on wrong 
basis.  
 
Our study does not differ between the different 
networks USOs use to extract the network 
content. We look at the content, and not 
explicitly from where the content is being 
extracted. Further research in this area might 
give indications to researchers and even 
specific advice to academic entrepreneurs and 
policymakers in USOs and TTOs. To further 
investigate if there exists a correlation between 
specific networks and the probability for 
success would be an example of such a task. 
This would make it easier for future USOs to 
narrow their focus area towards persons with 
the right network ties, instead of using 
resources on gathering less important ties.  
 
A further extension could be to depict where 
these networks exist and how to acquire them. 
One dimension could be to assess what 
stakeholders in USOs that would be able to 
affect the outcome, due to their network. Using 
agency theory (Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, 1989), 
one can see that there are different motives for 
a regular employee, CEO or board member 
when using their personal network for the 
benefit of the USO. Clearly, these positions 
differ in their impact potential for acquiring 
network benefits. Findings within this topic 
would provide USOs with a useful toolbox, to 
increase their chances of success.  
 
Initial strong ties for USOs often lead to 
technology transfer offices. As we have found, 
much of the literature elaborates on how USOs 
and academic entrepreneurs are borrowing 
network from these actors, to try to connect to 
commercial actors. However, not all USOs 
have access to, or use TTOs. As Mosey and 
Wright (2007) stated, habitual entrepreneurs 
often go past these actors, establishing 
networks themselves. The chances of success 
for an experienced entrepreneur are arguably 
favourable, but what if inexperienced 
entrepreneurs do this exercise? Would it 
implicate the establishment of strong ties to 
other actors, or would it simply just affect the 
chances for success? The answer to these 
questions could to a large extent provide 
support to the models proposed in this paper. 
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Abstract 
University spin-off companies have verified their potential as a wealth creating strategy in 
commercializing intellectual property from universities. However, they are complex entities, 
suffering under shortage of essential resources. This study seeks out to investigate the benefits 
provided by the network of the board for university spin-off companies. Drawing on Board 
Capital theory, we explore the success rate in connection to the initial board composition, through 
a quantitative analysis of 70 Norwegian university spin-off companies. Our findings suggest that 
boards with network from prior entrepreneurial or senior level management experience enhance 
the probability of success. Moreover, we propose a set of implications, which may help academic 
entrepreneurs and university spin-off companies in acquiring the right combination of experience 
to their initial boards. The implications use a three-way perspective, with a focus on 
entrepreneurs and USOs, technology transfer offices and researchers. 
 
 
Introduction 
This study aims to investigate the impact 
different types of initial networks have on the 
performance of university spin-off companies, 
so-called USOs. USOs are technology-based 
firms spun out from a university or a research 
institution with the aim to commercialize a 
technology developed at the academic 
institution (Birley, 2002). Encouraged by 
changed external expectations and internal 
pressure to generate new sources of income, 
universities’ involvement in technology 
transfer activities have escalated (Powers & 
McDougall, 2005). The use of technology 
licensing has traditionally been the mechanism 
by which a university has developed and 
transferred research to marketable products 
(Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, & Link, 2003). In 
recent years however, universities have shifted 
more towards spinning out start-up companies 
or licensing out the developed technology to 
smaller firms, rather than to large public 
companies (Powers & McDougall, 2005). The 
risks connected to such activities are higher, 
however, if a firm goes public, the returns 
could be enormous (Powers & McDougall, 
2005). Moreover, some technologies are 
unsuitable for licensing, making spinning out 
new ventures the preferable option. USOs can 
be an alternative effective way of transferring 
knowledge from universities to commercial 
use, in relation to licensing. USOs encourage 
economic development through generation of 
economic value, jobs and inducing investments 
in university technologies (Wright, 2007). They 
represent university efforts at enhancing 
revenue streams, effectively aligning university 
and firm interests, and increasing legitimacy 
towards external actors (Powers & McDougall, 
2005). Shane (2004) states that USOs are 
more profitable, survive longer, and reach the 
initial public offering threshold more often 
than licensing to established companies. 
However, Chiesa and Piccaluga (2000) found 
few USO successes, when they investigated the 
field. In opposition to other start-ups, USOs 
are rare, atypical entities that often suffer in 
terms of shortage of essential resources (Shane 
& Cable, 2002). They face technological 
 2 
uncertainty, with a non-verified technology, 
and market uncertainty, without knowing if 
their invention will be positively embraced. 
They also face organisational uncertainty, if 
there has to be a new entity spun out 
(Rasmussen, Borlaug, & Bulanova, 2013). The 
technologies are found to be radical and 
general-purpose, and they often struggle in 
raising financial support (Wright, Lockett, 
Clarysse, & Binks, 2006). This area of study is 
growing increasingly, which reflects the 
increase of USO formation (Lockett, Siegel, 
Wright, & Ensley, 2005; Shane, 2004; Wright, 
2007). 
 
The board of directors and its relationship to 
firm performance have long been an 
interesting area of research. Widding (2005) 
introduces knowledge reservoirs, a concept 
based on how managers build and acquire 
knowledge essential to achieve competitive 
advantage, and discuss the boards’ 
contribution to USOs through what he defines 
as semi-internal knowledge reservoirs. 
Research theorize that board composition 
represents the potential for acquiring resources 
a firm lacks through their pre-existing ties to 
external actors (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000). USOs are often knowledge driven and 
have access to other academic resources 
(Clarysse, Wright, Lockett, Mustar, & 
Knockaert, 2007). However, the role of boards 
in USOs have not yet been fully investigated 
(Clarysse et al., 2007). USOs are at founding 
often small, and the board constitutes a major 
part of their potential to access resources that 
are unavailable internally (Widding, 2005). 
Few new ventures enjoy the full range of 
knowledge and experience needed to function 
cost-effectively, and board members with 
external network can be a source for obtaining 
that. The board of directors may also help to 
increase the credibility for USOs and thus 
reducing the liabilities of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965), hence contributing to the 
development of the firm (Lynall, Golden, & 
Hillman, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Boards in the context of USOs are particularly 
interesting to study, given that they are new 
ventures in transition and, given their 
particular characteristics mentioned above, are 
very dependent on external inputs. To enable 
the transition from a non-commercial 
environment to the market, they need to 
develop their resources and capabilities. 
 
Earlier studies have focused primarily on easily 
measured attributes, such as board 
independence or board size. However, a 
growing body of research on directors’ 
experiences, skills, and other characteristics 
has emerged (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 
2013). A number of theories - most notably 
agency, resource dependence, institutional and 
social network theories - have been attempted 
to act as a theoretical lens to explain these 
attributes and their effect on firms, with 
inconclusive findings (Bhagat & Black, 1999; 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). 
Much of the research assumes composition-
conduct-performance relationships, which 
constitutes that board independence, 
experience and social ties will affect firm-level 
outcomes (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 
2008). Johnson et al. (2013) recommend that 
more studies focus on board composition to 
enhance this stream of research. 
 
This study sets out to empirically explore the 
effects of the boards’ initial network. it builds 
on the literature review, presented by Fischer 
and Våge (2013), and board capital; a capital 
consisting of social capital and expertise, 
experience, knowledge and reputation 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The theoretical 
framework presents three research hypotheses, 
which were tested on a sample of 70 
Norwegian USOs. The unit of analysis is the 
board as a connector to external resources. 
Studies of network in the context of 
entrepreneurship seldom take a quantitative 
approach (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 1998). To 
expand this field of research, our study hence 
adopts a quantitative method to employ 
statistical tools to investigate our research 
questions.  
 
This introduction is followed by a theoretical 
framework, presenting our hypothesis. We 
discuss the research design and the data 
collection methods, followed by a presentation 
of our findings. We then discuss our findings 
and view them in the context of board capital. 
Finally, we present implications and areas for 
further research. 
 
Theoretical framework 
This section draws on Fischer and Våge’s 
(2013) study of the networks influence on 
USOs, which provides the basis of our 
theoretical framework. Fischer and Våge’s 
study uses resource-based view (RBT) and 
social capital (SCT) as their main theoretical 
foundation. A state-of-the-art literature review 
was conducted, where network benefits for 
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USOs were investigated. Further, the study 
draws special attention to the characteristics of 
the networks enabling the benefits to be 
obtained. The findings are seen in the context 
of board capital theory, as the board 
constitutes a tool to access network actors. We 
use SCT to enlighten the dependence USOs 
have on establishing external linkages, and 
argue that RBT is convenient to use for 
describing social capital as a critical resource 
available to USOs.  
 
The benefits present in USOs’ 
network - and its 
characteristics 
The literature on entrepreneurship today 
assumes that there are benefits to harvest from 
networks especially in the start-up period of 
businesses (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 1998). A 
network with non-redundant ties offers a 
higher probability of venture capital funding 
(Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001; Shane & Stuart, 
2002; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). Because of their 
connection with universities and the help from 
their affiliated TTOs, USOs are able to 
penetrate the venture capital network more 
easily than independent start-ups and 
corporate spin-offs (Heirman & Clarysse, 
2004; Walter, Auer, & Ritter, 2006). One 
reason for this is argued to be the “inherited” 
legitimacy USOs receive through strong ties to 
their parent academic organization. Also, 
corporate spin-offs can enjoy resource 
endowments from their parent companies, and 
might not be that dependent on venture 
capital, as USOs are.  
 
The concept of hierarchical networks, and how 
these are borrowed from so-called sponsors, 
are introduced by Burt (2000). The risks of 
getting too dependent on these actors are 
mentioned (Lubik, Garnsey, Minshall, & Platts, 
2013). Brush et al. (2001) further argue for 
how one must carefully consider the cost, 
timing and reliability of resource providers, as 
there are risks of getting locked with 
underperforming partners. 
 
Burt (2000) elaborates on how the ability to 
bridge structural holes is a key aspect for 
firms.  Hirai et al.’s (2013) study found that 
non-redundant ties enabled USOs to bridge 
these holes. However, for USOs to acquire the 
benefits from their non-redundant network, 
strong ties governed by trust had to be present. 
Fischer and Våge (2013) elaborate on how 
USOs need a non-redundant network to span 
over the structural holes, separating them from 
the commercial actors. They contend that 
USOs should strive for such a non-redundant 
network with strong ties. The key problem 
facing USOs are their institutional origin. A 
model illustrating the process USOs could 
undergo to obtain the abovementioned benefits 
is presented below. 
 
 
Figure 1: Representation of initial USO network – 
hierarchical network 
 
USOs start with strong ties to external actors to 
access timely and valuable information, and to 
overcome the typical initial disadvantages, 
shown in figure 1. They also borrow the 
sponsors’ ties, and become a part of the 
sponsors’ non-redundant network. 
Immediately, the USO should try to evolve the 
indirect ties into personal, strong ties, to 
prevent dependencies on their primary strong 
ties (Fischer & Våge, 2013). This is shown in 
figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Representation of initial USO network – 
converted network 
 
A clear problem arises when the sponsors do 
not offer indirect ties that bridge the USO to 
the preferred markets. A possible method to 
gain access to bridging sponsors is to identify 
potential indirect ties that most likely are able 
to bridge the structural holes. By strategically 
inducing network ties towards the preferred 
sponsors, the structural holes may still be 
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bridged (Fischer & Våge, 2013). This method 
was found to be used frequently by experienced 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Establishing relationships to persons with 
prior network ties is often a cost-effective way 
to connect with non-redundant networks 
(Fischer & Våge, 2013). USOs are normally 
small at founding, and the employees, together 
with the board, constitute the available social 
capital. We argue that the external ties offered 
by board members are important to investigate 
in the context of USOs, as a tool for accessing 
non-redundant networks. Boards are a way for 
USOs to bridge the structural holes in their 
environment. If they add persons with 
connections to beneficial actors, the USO can 
apply them to gain the benefits mentioned by 
Fischer and Våge (2013). From figure 1 and 2, 
board members can take the sponsor role, with 
timely access to information and advice. The 
costs connected with the gathering of network 
ties are hence minimized. Moreover, to add 
persons with prior experience of building 
network ties, the board can be a method for 
USOs to convert indirect ties into strong ties.  
 
Board composition 
Board of directors plays an important role in 
the development of USOs. The role of board 
members contributes to strategic flexibility and 
enhance firm growth and survival (Filatotchev, 
Toms, & Wright, 2006). Rasmussen et al. 
(2013) found that for Norwegian USOs, the 
board, together with the academic institution 
from which they were spun out, contributed 
more significantly to firm growth, compared to 
venture capitalists, TTOs and industry partners 
separately. However, TTO representatives and 
venture capitalists are normally a part of USO 
boards, and are hence contributing through 
their directorships. Board members that are 
broadly connected to external players normally 
offer non-redundant ties, and give USOs quick 
access to information and resources (Oh, 
Labianca, & Chung, 2006). A well-established 
resource base help reduce dependency between 
the organization and the external actors 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), lower uncertainty 
and the transaction costs (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Williamson, 1999), which enhance the survival 
rate of firms (Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986). 
 
Many scholars take an internal governance 
approach rather than an external network 
approach, when investigating board 
composition (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). They 
state that boards comprised with outside 
directors will be more effective. Outside 
directors do not hold stakeholder position in 
the firm, and will prevent managers from 
behaving in self-interest (Platt & Platt, 2012). 
Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) however, 
criticize this focus and argue that it is the 
quality of the board members that affects a 
board’s effectiveness. Attention should be 
given towards the understanding of how to 
compose an effective board, and this article 
seeks to do so. 
 
Board capital 
Fischer and Våge (2013) uses SCT and RBT as 
theoretical framework. Board members with 
prior industry experience will normally 
establish industry ties to their prior colleagues 
and suppliers/customers. In this section we 
introduce board capital theory, and present 
three hypotheses. We argue that prior 
professional experience can be operationalized 
as an indicator for social capital. 
 
Johnson et al. (2013) address social capital in 
combination with board composition. They 
state, together with Carpenter and Westphal 
(2001), that the board’s social capital is a 
channel for the flow of resources, information 
and advice for a firm. It can be argued that 
antecedent experience contributes to social 
capital. A prior job provides network ties to 
industry players you interact with. Board 
capital is defined as both social capital and 
experience, knowledge and reputation 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Empirical studies 
have shown a relationship between board 
capital and performance (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 
1972). 
 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), a 
board member that is brought to the board 
constitutes four benefits: (1) advice and 
counsel, (2) communication channels towards 
external actors, (3) legitimacy, and (4) 
preferential access to support. These benefits 
are similar to the network benefits addressed 
in Fischer and Våge’s (2013) study. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) further conclude that these 
benefits contribute to resource accessibility 
from the external environment. Each board 
member brings a different and unique set of 
skills to a firm, together with their network 
(Kosnik, 1990). 
 
Firstly, boards consisting of members that 
bring with them important expertise, 
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experience and skills to facilitate advice and 
counsel, will help the firm take better decisions 
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985).  A board with 
lawyers will be better suited to guide the firm 
to take better legal decisions, in comparison to 
a board with only members connected to an 
academic institution. Westphal (1999) links 
advice and counsel to subsequent firm 
performance. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) 
also found that a board’s social capital, 
consisting of directors having ties to external 
actors, were able to provide better advice and 
counsel. 
 
Secondly, board capital has been positively 
associated with a firm’s legitimacy and 
reputation (Daily & Schwenk, 1996). Pfeffer 
and Salancik state that “prestigious or 
legitimate persons or organizations 
represented on the focal organization’s board 
provide confirmation to the rest of the world of 
the value and worth of the organization” 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 145). Galaskiewicz 
(1985) also points on how external ties 
possessed by the board of directors confer 
legitimacy towards the external environment. 
 
Thirdly, board capital enhance the information 
channel the firm has towards the environment 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Similarities can be 
drawn to Burt’s (2002) theories on structural 
holes. Board capital can link USOs to clusters 
of additive information by bridging the 
structural holes present in their environment. 
A board with heterogeneous ties connected to 
external actors will be provided with timely 
and valuable information, and board members’ 
external ties also facilitates access to strategic 
opportunities (Pfeffer, 1991). Boeker (1997), 
Kor (2003) and Spender (1989) point on board 
members’ industry experience and how it 
provides them with tacit knowledge of the 
opportunities, threats, competitive conditions, 
technology and regulations specific to an 
industry. Having a board composition of 
industry-experienced members provides the 
board with resources to better take good 
decisions. 
 
Lastly, board capital can be used as an 
instrumental resource to gain access to 
resources outside the firm, often on more 
favourable terms (Boeker & Goodstein, 1991). 
Pfeffer (1972) found a positive correlation 
between performance and firms with directors’ 
ties to sectors with constrained resources. 
Hence, the directors’ ties can connect USOs 
with resource providers, and enhance the 
development of the firm. This is also supported 
by Mizruchi and Stearns (2006). 
 
Based on board capital theory, we will 
investigate the impact a board’s social capital, 
combined with expertise, experience, 
knowledge and reputation, has on USO 
performance. Research show that pre-existing 
knowledge and skills derives from prior 
professional experience (Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991), and that directors’ past 
professional experience also produce social 
capital (Certo, 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Different industries and positions are sources 
to differences in social capital, and it is 
therefore important to take this into account 
when examining board benefits. 
 
We introduce executive level network, defined 
as network ties gained through prior 
entrepreneurial -, senior management - and 
significant board experience. Our assumption 
is that experience is linked to network and 
operationalize network ties through such 
experience, given their former position as 
respectively founder or senior manager, or 
having significant board experience. The 
common notifier for these ties is the access to 
decision makers in industries and 
environments. Having ties to executive level 
networks, as well as having entrepreneurial 
experience, are found to facilitate the 
legitimacy process (Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz, 
2010; Johnson et al., 2013). Rasmussen et al. 
(2011) pointed on the effect of an 
entrepreneur’s antecedent network as a bridge 
to resources, and found that habitual 
entrepreneurs possess competencies regarding 
how to access industry partners and investors. 
Directors’ participation in multiple boards help 
build social capital by connecting ties to other 
directors (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). 
When an individual sits on two or more 
corporate boards it is defined by Scott (1991) as 
interlocking directorship. These connections 
can provide timely access to ideas, knowledge, 
resources and information (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009). However, having 
significant board experience may indicate that 
the director still possess several board 
positions. Serving on many boards may limit 
the necessary time needed to govern effectively 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001), and hence 
affect their contribution to the board. 
Nevertheless, Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) 
tested the relationship between membership 
on multiple boards and the rate of growth and 
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found a positive correlation, hence leading us 
to our first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Presence of executive network 
for the initial board of directors increases the 
likelihood of success for USOs. 
 
Social capital gained through prior experience 
in the relevant industry, other industries and 
academic experience affect board decisions and 
what they pay attention to (Johnson et al., 
2013). We define these ties as profession-
related network. These types of networks are 
distinguished from executive networks in the 
fashion that they comprise a more dense and 
constricted type of ties, specific to the 
industries. Executive networks offer ties to 
higher level actors, typically on senior level, 
inducing loose networks, while profession-
related networks are ties to lower level actors. 
They are not communicating with decision 
makers, but may know more about specific 
details. Industry experience have been found to 
be positively associated with performance (Kor 
& Sundaramurthy, 2009), and external 
connections developed through industry 
experience may help firms to access resources 
and establish business relationships (Pfeffer, 
1972). Having industry familiarity helps boards 
to process information better, and see 
opportunities that others don’t see (Johnson et 
al., 2013), mainly due to their tacit knowledge 
of the opportunities, threats, competitive 
conditions, technology and regulations specific 
to the relevant industry (Kor, 2003).  
 
Research on Norwegian USOs found that the 
academic institution from where they spun out, 
contributed more significantly in regards to 
legitimize their product than TTOs, industry 
partners, customers and financial actors, 
separately (Rasmussen et al., 2013). However, 
Mosey and Wright (2007) concluded that 
neither prior industrial experience or seniority 
of academic position did relate to venture 
growth. This inconsistency makes the topic 
interesting to investigate. Equally important 
are the prior development of goodwill and 
connections to industry players (Certo, 2003). 
Board members can leverage prior goodwill to 
obtain information, influence and solidarity 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002). Such connections are 
highlighted by Cooper et al. (1994) as 
especially critical for entrepreneurial firms. 
Our second hypothesis hence follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Presence of profession related 
network for the initial board of directors 
increases the likelihood of success for USOs.  
 
A number of studies have found that boards’ 
age contribute to firm success. Platt and Platt’s 
(2012) study on director age in connection with 
firm bankruptcy indicates that a lower average 
age for the board of directors increase the 
likelihood of bankruptcy, hence suggesting that 
experience gained through years of working is 
valuable. Age can thus be seen as an indicator 
of more experience and network ties. Age 
diversity was also found to be associated with 
higher firm value (Johnson et al., 2013). 
 
The size of the board is an interesting variable. 
Social capital theory states that available 
network resources are to some extent given by 
network size (Aldrich & Reese, 1993), and 
hence supporting board size as an 
operationalization of network size. From 
resource based view it can be stated that a large 
board is more connected to external actors 
than small boards, and support USOs better in 
obtaining benefits from their pre-existing 
network (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Based on 
board theory concerning age and size we 
present our third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Higher average board member 
age and board size increase the likelihood of 
success for USOs. 
 
Methodology 
We analyse how board members’ earlier 
experience equips them with a network 
position, bridging structural holes, and hence 
gain timely access to ideas, knowledge, 
resources and information. Coleman (1989) 
and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) recognize 
that social capital and expertise, experience 
and knowledge are conceptually and 
empirically difficult to untangle, hence we 
operationalize that earlier experiences induce 
social capital. 
 
Sample and data collection 
The data set we analyse comprises 70 firms 
registered and supported by the FORNY 
program. The FORNY program, established by 
The Norwegian Council of Research, deals with 
pre-start-up academic spin-offs during the 
research and opportunity framing stages to 
support and bring forward the firms and their 
affiliated TTOs. The portfolio consists of 471 
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firms and 424 licensing agreements, ranging 
from year 1995 to 2012, with an annual budget 
of approximately NOK 155 million (Rasmussen 
& Gulbrandsen, 2012). The program receives 
funding from several ministries (Rasmussen & 
Gulbrandsen, 2012), and strives to both 
support technology transfer from research 
institutions and the creation of new businesses 
(Rasmussen et al., 2013). Our paper focuses on 
the creation of USOs. Norway introduced a 
legislative change in 2003, which is similar to 
the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act in the US, implying 
that researchers no longer hold intellectual 
property rights to their inventions (Rasmussen, 
Moen, & Gulbrandsen, 2006). Due to this 
change, and the subsequent establishment of 
TTOs connected to the main research 
institutions, it is fair to say that the portfolio 
includes the grand part of Norwegian USOs. 
The FORNY registers abled us to get data on 
firms that are no longer registered in national 
registers. This gave us access to data, free from 
survivor bias, in opposition to official registers, 
which is typically used in prior academic 
research. 
 
The sample of 70 was selected randomly from 
the 471 USOs, in the interval from 1999 to 
2004. Hence, there are no biases in regards to 
the choosing of cases. The connection to the 
FORNY program enabled us to get access to 
the entire history of the annual reports for each 
firm. The annual reports included the 
Director’s report, financial statements and 
ownership structure. We were also provided 
with extensive former media coverage, with 
relevant information from newspaper, 
magazines and the Internet. In addition to 
information regarding income statement, 
balance and board positions, we could also 
read the Directors’ report regarding future 
development and stock ownership overview. 
This made it possible to monitor possible 
mergers and acquisitions. We started an 
extensive data collection process, which can be 
described in two phases. The first phase 
comprised gathering of data to separate the 
USOs as success or failure. This phase was 
conducted as part of a larger research group, as 
part of a research project with NTNU and Bodø 
Business School, consisting of eight students, 
including the authors. 
 
Annual reports, national databases and media 
were scanned and crosschecked to fully 
understand the history for each of the USOs. 
The extracted data can be sectioned into two 
levels: (1) information describing the content 
and interior of the firms, including business 
idea, company development, key product, 
industry and owner structure, and (2) outcome 
describing venture capital financing, mergers 
and acquisitions, and discontinuations. The 
data were registered in separate files for the 
individual USOs, using a standardized 
template1, developed by a senior researcher in 
the team. Comments elaborating on diverging 
or interesting occurrences were noted to 
ensure the possibility of verifying or 
discovering any biases or misinterpretations in 
our data. Continuous communication and 
mutual reviews were performed to assure that 
the heuristics behind the coding were 
understood in similar fashion by the 
researchers. In addition, the majority of the 
codings were approved by senior researchers2 
to ensure coherence and robustness between 
the classifications performed and other 
research.  
 
The second phase of the data gathering 
constituted a collection of the board members’ 
information for the individual USOs, and was 
performed by the authors alone. This 
comprised thorough mapping of each board 
members’ experience. Each board member was 
individually checked for work experience, both 
academic and commercial, using web search 
and the business-oriented social network 
service LinkedIn. Some board members were 
not found using this service. A general Google 
search was then conducted, to gather work-
related information. A subjective impression of 
the board members was then made. Their 
former board experience was checked using 
www.purehelp.no, a national database 
containing all former board experience for 
people still active in boards. The database also 
provides information regarding former 
managing director positions for each person. 
Age was also gathered from this source. In 
addition, we performed a web search for 
résumés and other media postings, to 
supplement our findings. Thereafter, the data 
was put in a board matrix with binary 
variables, indicating each board member’s 
experience. In total, we mapped prior 
experience for a total of 601 individual board 
members. Further, we extracted data regarding 
revenue and operational income for each USO. 
This was done to distinguish active and 
successful USOs from firms not liquidated, but 
                                                            
1 The coding template can be made available on request 
2  Senior Researcher Einar Rasmussen and Ph.D. 
Candidate Marius Tuft Mathisen. 
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with a low probability for future success. An 
excerpt of the coding sheet used is presented in 
appendix 2. Finally the entirety of the codings 
was gathered in a sample summary file 3 , 
counting each firm as an individual case with 
variables reflecting the code sheet. The 
codebook used for the gathering of data and for 
further statistical analysis can be found in 
appendix 1. 
 
With respect to the legislative change in 2003, 
we chose to restrict our sample to firms 
incorporated before this legislation was fully 
instated, choosing 2004 as our cut-off point. 
Earlier research on the FORNY portfolio also 
found that USOs in the Bio/Pharma industry 
had the longest average commercialization 
period, being 8 years (Rasmussen et al., 2013). 
Hence, our cut-off point for founding year 
would to some extent prevent significant right 
censoring of our data. 
 
Method 
We investigate the outcome of USOs in the 
context of success. In some cases event history 
analysis would be an applicable method. 
However, as we only measure independent 
variables at incorporation and event, we see 
methodological weaknesses towards trying to 
assess and predict the probability of success at 
any given time. We will therefore disregard this 
and look at a simple true/false event analysis. 
 
We analyse the dichotomous outcome-variable 
success and examine its dependence on the 
aggregate of the different network types the 
board possess. This, and the presence of 
multiple continuous and categorical predictor 
variables, indicate the use of logistic regression 
as an acceptable method. The analysis is 
conducted two times. The first analysis is 
performed on the data describing the USO at 
founding. The second analysis is performed on 
the data describing the end event. We conduct 
this to look for changes in the type of 
experience that is predictive of success. If this 
concurs with existing literature on how firms’ 
needs evolve, we will be more certain of that 
our operationalization are appropriate. Thus, 
the second regression is performed to support 
the findings in first regression and should not 
be viewed as a standalone analysis.  
 
 
                                                            
3  The script of this compilation is available in 
Appendix 3. 
Dependent variables 
In order to investigate the spin-off 
performance, it is important to recognize the 
multidimensional nature of the performance 
construct (Chakravarthy, 1986). Our 
dependent outcome variable describes whether 
or not the firm has achieved success by the end 
of 2012. We draw on Rasmussen et al.’s (2013) 
classification of outcomes, summarized in table 
1. Given that many of the USOs in our sample 
are living deads, being firms not liquidated, but 
with a low probability for future success, we 
code USOs as success based on market 
acceptance.  
 
Table 1. Classification of outcomes 
Outcome Category Definition 
Positive 
outcome 
Active, 
profitable 
Operating income 
exceeds NOK 500.000 
in 2012 
 Active, with 
high turnover 
Revenue exceeds NOK 
10.000.000 in 2012 
 Acquired The USO is acquired by 
other company 
Negative 
outcome 
Discontinued / 
deleted 
The firm is discontinued 
from the national 
registers brreg.no 
 Living dead 1,The firm is still 
registered, but does not 
meet the revenue or 
result limits 
 
 
A positive outcome implies that the product or 
the service is accepted by the market, and that 
the USO is capable of making a profit of it. 
However, as this is hard to measure, we settle 
on using revenue and operating income as 
indicators for reaching such a milestone. We 
base the categorization of success on the firms’ 
financial performance and the occurrence of 
acquisition. USOs with revenue higher than 
NOK 10.000.000 in 2012 are coded as 
successful. Reaching this threshold indicates 
high activity in the start-up, and has probably 
proven investor acceptance. Success is also 
coded if the USO’s operating income in 2012 
exceeds NOK 500.000. The USO has then 
shown profitability for its product/service. 
Rasmussen et al. (2013) used a similar cap on 
operating income, at NOK 100.000. However, 
when reviewing the distribution of revenue and 
operating income, we found a significant 
distinction of firms under and above the 
respective limits. After reviewing these findings 
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in consultation with academic researches at 
NTNU, we concluded on that these distinctions 
were indicative of some kind of performance 
threshold, and thus decided on using these as 
limits. 
 
USOs that have been acquired are coded as 
successful. We define an acquisition as a 
transaction driven by industrial motivations, 
based on the perceived qualities in the USO. 
An acquisition is often a valuable societal and 
financial solution. The acquiring firm has 
resources to quickly take the product out to 
market, after the concept has been proved to 
work. Although an acquisition is not 
necessarily tantamount to success, it is fair to 
say that the concept has been valued 
interesting. If the USO however, merges under 
distressed conditions, it is not coded as an 
acquisition.  
 
A failing USO can be indicated in many 
different ways. Some firms are discontinued, 
while others stay alive with low or no activity. 
Some firms also have substantial activity, but 
fail to make any profit. Based on this, a 
negative outcome is categorized as a failure 
based on discontinuation, low activity or low 
profit, often known as living deads. A 
discontinued USO is deleted from the 
Brønnøysund register. Living deads have little 
activity, and may lack financial resources to 
start or continue commercializing.  
 
Rasmussen et al. (2013) also include a category 
of unknown outcomes in their report on USOs 
included in the FORNY-program. These are 
often firms that have not yet had the time to 
commercialize, and thus still have an uncertain 
future. As we have been fairly restrictive in our 
time span, only including USOs from 1999 to 
2004, this type of outcome is rarely present in 
our sample. In regards of this, and as we want 
a dichotomous outcome variable, we have not 
taken use of this category. This contends that 
firms that would have been registered as 
unknown will be registered as failures in our 
analysis. 
 
Independent variables 
Our measurement of the boards is performed 
with count measures where each firm has a 
score, reflecting the aggregate of board 
members possessing the different type of 
networks. The initial board is defined as the 
persons added to the board from founding and 
the continuing 18 months. We found a 
repeating tendency for USOs to add board 
members between 12 and 18 months, and 
wanted to include their networks in our 
analysis. This scale measure is used in a similar 
fashion across levels of analysis to assess the 
amount of certain characteristics in boards 
(Johnson et al., 2013). We divide networks into 
different categories - depending on what type 
of network ties the board members’ prior 
experience have given. The criteria for the 
allocation of the different network variables are 
elaborated within each category. A board 
member can be placed in various categories 
depending on his/her prior experience.  
 
Similar types of networks are more likely to 
correlate, and are therefore placed in groups 
with each other to act as controls. Correlating 
variables have similar variance, and using 
them as controls for each other thus provides 
better results as we eliminate the contribution 
effect from the other.  The situation of a 
possible correlation between the predictor 
variables makes the use of a hierarchical 
method of preference (Lewis, 2007; Pedhazur, 
1997). Introducing the variables in blocks, 
allows us see how variables perform in effect of 
control from other variables. The order of 
presentation of the blocks reflects the order of 
how the hierarchical regression analysis is 
performed. 
 
Executive level network 
Our first hypothesis states that board members 
with prior entrepreneurial, senior management 
and/or significant board experience will 
contribute with network ties to what we define 
as senior level actors. These board members 
presumably help to gap the structural holes 
USOs are faced with. We have assessed each of 
these types of experiences separately. A board 
member will be denoted with the value 1 for 
each experience variable he possesses. 
 
Entrepreneurial experience constitutes board 
members who have been active and 
participating in the process of founding a new 
firm. Board members with entrepreneurial 
experience are found to have a loose network, 
and thus provide less redundant information 
(Burt, 1992). They also have a larger number of 
indirect contacts, contributing to access a more 
diverse information flow (Greve, 1995). 
Habitual entrepreneurs also possess 
competencies regarding how to access industry 
partners and investors (Rasmussen et al., 
2011), and may guide boards to connect to 
beneficial sponsors. 
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Senior management experience are board 
members with former positions at the senior 
management level. The former firms were 
checked subjectively, to separate senior 
management experience from holding 
companies and sole proprietorship. It is 
evident that the network gained from senior 
positions at Statoil ASA is substantially bigger 
than a senior management position at a local 
grocery store. Senior management experience 
offers boards with connections to decision 
makers, which might provide benefits for the 
USO. Boards consisting of members with prior 
senior management experience may also offer 
legitimacy to the market. Founders of firms 
often have senior management titles. These 
types of positions might not be comparable 
with the magnitude of management experience 
at larger firms. A person with a senior 
management position in a start-up is therefore 
only given entrepreneurial experience at first. 
If the firm then is considered to have gone 
from adolescence to maturity 4 , during the 
period when the board member was active, we 
will credit the Senior Management variable in 
addition to Entrepreneurial.  
 
Board members’ participation in multiple 
boards may increase social capital in terms of 
connectivity to other board members 
(Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). The variable Significant board 
experience is credited if the person has more 
than ten former board positions, or a board 
position in a firm with more than NOK 
30.000.000 in yearly revenue during the given 
period. This limit was chosen in consultation 
with two experienced researchers on the field5. 
 
Profession-related network 
Our second hypothesis contends that board 
members with prior industrial, other industrial 
and/or academic experience will contribute 
with network ties to actors with tacit 
knowledge in the context of opportunity 
recognition and advice to help USOs 
understand the industry’s current dynamics. If 
a board member has such prior experience, 
                                                            
4  In this assessment we use Quinn and Cameron’s 
(1983) integrative model for new firms. The final stage, 
“Elaboration of structure” is identified by stronger cash 
flows, resource allocation decisions focused on 
expansion within the chosen domain, and adaption of 
strategies emphasizing productivity enhancement 
(Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). 
5  Postdoc Researcher Ekaterina Bjørnåli and Ph.D. 
Candidate Marius Tuft Mathisen 
and hence is believed to have network ties to 
the abovementioned actors, he/she is denoted 
with the value 1 in the respective category. 
 
Academic experience constitutes the network 
obtained by having former experience from 
research or other academic environments. 
Grandi and Grimaldi (2003) investigated 
academic entrepreneurs in the context of 
network characteristics, and found that ties to 
industry actors, developed during the 
entrepreneurs’ time at the academic 
institution, was the first interaction with the 
market. Also, the academic network can offer 
information regarding technology and 
products worldwide, that actors outside this 
network do not gain access to. These 
technologies are not publicly known, and such 
information thus gives USOs a competitive 
advantage.  
 
Industry experience quip board members with 
goodwill and connections with industry 
players, and can hence help USOs acquire 
critical resources, gain legitimacy and initiate 
relationships to nourish firm growth (Certo, 
2003). Experience within the industry where 
the USO is located, and where it is likely there 
has been developed a network from this 
position, is credited for this variable. If the 
board member also had a position at senior 
management level, this is recorded in addition.  
 
Other industrial experience concerns network 
developed by having a position in a firm 
outside the relevant industry for the USO. 
Through work experience board members add 
new network nodes, hence spanning structural 
holes. The experience gained from the position 
had to be at a level where one safely could 
assume that the person had gained a 
noteworthy set of ties. 
 
Board structure 
Our third hypothesis states that board 
members’ average age and board size will bring 
in more network ties and generally more 
experience to USOs, which may lead to better 
performance. The following variables where 
registered as scale measures. 
 
Board member age was found mainly from 
www.purehelp.no 6 . We used their age at 
founding and calculated the average age of the 
                                                            
6  www.purehelp.no is a Norwegian site that offers 
information about previous board positions from 2002 
until today. 
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board. Our contention is that a high age is 
correlated with more experience; hence an 
older board member brings more value to the 
USO.  
 
Board size is associated with better 
performance (Pfeffer, 1972) and USOs’ board 
size was found from www.brreg.no 7 . We 
contend that more individuals bring more 
board capital into the board, and providing a 
better platform for success. 
 
Control variables 
In the use of control variables, we are looking 
for other variables that might cause some 
variance in our sample. In regression analysis, 
every variable included in the model acts as a 
control to the others. Control variables are thus 
variables included only to improve the 
reliability of other variables. When dealing 
with such a small sample as we are in this 
study, the ratio between number of predictors 
and sample size must be taken into account. 
Rules of thumb suggest a minimum of 10-15 
cases per predictor, but lately there has been 
published some findings on how these rules 
may be relaxed (Vittinghoff & McCulloch, 
2007). However, there is still a general 
understanding that the reliability of the 
individual variables and the model is lost when 
stressing these boundaries (Green, 1991). The 
inclusion of control variables has thus been 
thoroughly reviewed, as we do not want to 
include variables with no 
predictive/controlling power.  
 
As we investigate the firms from the moment 
of founding, the set of variables should 
describe the environment and the total outlook 
of the firm from this date on. As of this, we 
have been very restrictive in the selection of 
control variables and have excluded variables 
like VC funding and number of employees, as 
they are all controlling for an environment 
which does not exist at founding. In choosing 
these control variables, we have taken use of 
the recent report from Rasmussen et al. 
(2013),which has used data from a large 
sample of USOs in Norway. As our study looks 
at a sample in a restricted time frame we are 
controlling for the industries with significantly 
different commercialisation times. Software is 
known for having a short commercialisation 
                                                            
7 www.brreg.no is a site for the Norwegian government 
agency that is responsible for the management of 
public registers. Information and announcements for 
each registered firm is available. 
period, while Bio/Pharma normally has a 
longer period. These are coded as separate 
dummy variables where respectively IT and 
Bio/Pharma are allocated the value 1 if the firm 
operates in one of these industries.  
 
Our sample contains firms founded between 
1999 and 2004. As known, the dot-com bubble 
burst in 2000. Although Norway was not in the 
epicentre of this burst, some effects has been 
registered. Customers, investors and venture 
capitalists were hesitant in their actions. This 
also affected new firms to some extent. Thus, 
we control for the year of founding. DfBeta 
values measure how much an observation has 
affected the estimate of a regression coefficient. 
The inclusion of years as a scale variable 
affected the constant substantially. To avoid 
these fluctuating DfBeta values for the constant 
in our model, we coded founding year as years 
since founding. This means that the firms 
incorporated in 1999 have the value 15, 
decreasing for younger firms. There are no 
implications of this on the model or other 
variables, however, because of the scale change 
on the founding year variable, these 
correlations and exp(b) values are inversed.  
 
In addition to the abovementioned control 
variables, we considered using Related TTO 
and Region as control variables. As these 
variables are nominal, and thus would be 
categorical variables, the inclusion of them 
would implicate a large set of extra dummy 
variables. As we are already on the boundaries 
of our variables, this would be unfortunate for 
our model. Furthermore, though such variables 
are important in a cross-country sample, 
Norway is a small and culturally homogeneous 
country, with no significant differences 
between the locations. In addition, after 
running test-regressions with these variables 
included, we found no or little predictive power 
and thus decided to not include them in our 
model.  
 
Sample, control and 
verification 
To detect outliers, descriptive statistics have 
been reviewed for each variable. In addition, 
the sample was screened for influential and 
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outlying cases by using leverage 8 , Cook’s 
distance and DfBetas9 as indicators. 
 
After collecting all the data, we performed 
Harman’s one-factor test to check for common 
method bias. If common method bias were a 
problem, we would expect one variable to 
stand out in a factor analysis. In the unrotated 
factor analysis, one factor accounted for about 
33% of the variance, which is an acceptable 
level (Aulakh & Gencturk, 2000). 
 
The sample and the variables were further 
tested for multicollinearity. First, by assessing 
the Pearson correlation table and looking if 
correlation between variables exceeds 0.8. 
Then, by performing a multiple regression10 
and checking for the variance inflation 
factor11. As expected, after seeing the Pearson 
correlation matrix, Senior mgmt. experience 
stood out as the variable with highest 
multicollinearity, with the value 3. No values 
exceeded our critical VIF-limit of 10.  
 
Limitations 
A key limitation for our study is the lack of 
longitudinal approach. We assume that the 
performance of the USO is due to the impact 
performed by the initial board. We do not 
access the board members added at a later 
stage. As such, we are not able to separate the 
types of networks that are important at 
different stages. This aspect is further 
discussed under the chapter Further research.  
 
We have used operating income and revenue to 
distinguish USOs from success and failure. As 
                                                            
8  Cases where declared influential and further 
investigated if h>2(k+1)/n, where k is the number of 
covariates and n is the number of cases (Belsley, Kuh, 
& Welsch).  
9 A Cook’s distance- or a DfBeta value above 1 were also 
taken as indicator of an outlier (Cook, 1977; Sarkar, 
Midi, & Rana, 2011). 
10 This is possible because the dependent variable (in 
our case, dichotomous) is not involved in the 
multicollinearity (Eikemo & Clausen, 2012; Field, 
2005). 
11 The Variance inflation factor (VIF) is an index which 
measures how much the variance (square of the 
estimate’s standard deviation) of an estimated 
regression coefficient is increased because of 
collinearity; a VIF of 10 indicates that the standard 
error is inflated by a factor of 10 due to 
multicollinearity to other variables (O’brien, 2007). 
VIF is the reciprocal of Tolerance (1-R^2), but VIF is 
more apprehendable. We therefore use VIF and 
instead adopt the most commonly used tolerance level 
for Tolerance (0,10) and convert it to its VIF-equival 
value (1/0,1=10) to use this as our VIF-tolerance value. 
USOs typically need 10 years or more to show a 
significant growth (Smith & Bagchi-Sen, 2012), 
there might be successful USOs in our sample 
that are coded as living dead, due to lack of 
development to deliver sufficient revenue or 
operating income. Concerning revenue and 
operating income, another limitation for our 
method is its perspective. We measure the 
variables at founding and at year 2012. This 
implies that there may have been undiscovered 
occurrences with influential effects on the 
USOs. USOs with sufficient revenue or 
operating income in between the two time 
events, but ended 2012 insufficiently, have 
been coded as failures, despite their earlier 
success. Also, performance by financial metrics 
is always a temporary position, and might 
change in the future. 
 
We have used www.linkedin.com, 
www.purehelp.no and general Google search 
for attaining the independent variables. 
LinkedIn lets each user post their online 
résumé. Optimally these résumés would be 
thoroughly filled out with all former positions 
and achievements. However, the majority of 
these résumés have flaws i.e. missing 
information to some degree. There is also a risk 
of fabrication. Nonetheless, flaws will be 
present in classical surveys as well, and we 
contend that our data sample is as solid as 
survey data. The general Google search that is 
conducted gave very varying results, extending 
from complete résumés to no information at 
all. As senior management positions often are 
posted on company websites and 
entrepreneurial experience often turns up in 
news, these are more likely to be revealed than 
the other variables. Academic and regular 
industrial positions are harder to spot using a 
basic Google search. We therefore contend that 
this limitation is affecting the other variables, 
excluding senior level management and 
entrepreneurial experience.  
 
Board experience ended before 2002 is not 
included in the Purehelp database, and 
represents another limitation to our study. 
Board members with extensive dictatorships 
earlier than 2002 will not be credited with 
significant board experience. Lastly, it is fair to 
say that the network gained through having a 
professional position for several years, 
compared to a short period of time is probably 
consists of more valuable ties. This is not taken 
into account in our independent variables, and 
hence constitutes a limitation. 
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Results 
Descriptive 
The sample consists of 70 firms - 21 coded as 
success and 49 as failures. As seen in figure 3, 
the distribution of successful firms is about 
equal with 10 firms having acquisition as the 
reason for success. The distribution within the 
failed firms is somewhat skewed. 22 of the 
firms have been counted as failures because of 
financial reasons. Only 11 of the 70 firms have 
been discontinued. 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of outcome
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of experience at founding and event 
 
The data regarding board members were 
gathered on to time events for the firm. As seen 
in figure 4 the change in these variables are 
trending upwards, with the exception of 
academic and entrepreneurial experience. This 
increase seems to be largest in senior 
management experience and significant board 
experience. It is likely to believe that these 
variables might be correlated to age of board 
members. And as we see in figure 5, this 
increase is also present in the mean age of the 
board members. This will be further examined 
in the inferential section. 
 
Figure 4 might indicate an increase in board 
members. However, this representation is also 
depicting the experience present in the firms, 
and not the number of board members. The 
mean board size actually decreased from 
founding to event. This evident change, 
represented in figure 6, might indicate that 
USOs are narrowing their boards to the most 
essential members during their lifetime. 
However, another reason for this decrease 
might be the time of measurement. As seen 
from the codings, many living dead firms cut 
their boards to only contain the owner or 
responsible person.  
 
Figure 5. Mean board age 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Number of board members 
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A more detailed overview of the different 
variables’, mean, max, min and standard 
deviations are found in appendix 4. 
 
Inferential 
Table 1 presents a Pearson correlation matrix 
with the variables ordered in blocks, reflecting 
the different hypotheses. There are mainly four 
different clusters of significant correlation.  
 
First, we see the Entrepreneurial (5) and 
Senior level management (6) variables 
correlating positively with success at a 
magnitude of 0,280. This will be further 
examined and controlled for in the regressions 
following. There is also an internal correlation 
between the variables in the Executive level 
block.  
 
 
Table 2. Pearson correlation matrix – at founding 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  Success (1) 1                       
Control 
variables 
Founding year (2) .138 1           
Software (3) .058 -.073 1          
Bio/Pharma (4) -.259* .077 -.286* 1                 
Executive 
level network 
Entrepreneurial (5) .280* .051 .192 -.037 1        
Senior level mgmt. (6) .280* -.073 .182 -.006 .459** 1       
Significant board (7) -.045 -.141 .071 -.073 .377** .506** 1           
Profession-
related 
network 
Academic (8) -.140 .093 .111 .229 .185 .156 .005 1     
Relevant industrial (9) .112 -.311** .079 .029 .169 .546** .235 .034 1    
Other industrial (10) .175 -.133 .108 -.016 .219 .604** .329** -.003 .332** 1     
Board 
structure 
Board size (11) .039 -.126 .234 -.158 .186 .284* .325** .073 .424** .434** 1   
Mean board age (12) -.201 -.030 -.171 .119 .087 .047 .269* .129 -.048 -.101 -.011 1 
 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Table 3. Hierarchical logistic regression – at founding 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
At founding Exp(B) Sig Exp(B) Sig Exp(B) Sig Exp(B) Sig 
Control variables         
Founding year 1.254 .171 1.223 .290 1.252 .281 1.255 .289 
Software 1.020 .971 .606 .465 .723 .650 .665 .589 
Bio/Pharma .174* .036 .097* .013 .100* .024 .107* .033 
Executive level network              
Entrepreneurial   6.668† .083 9.902† .060 11.015† .058 
Senior level mgmt.   3.107* .010 3.857* .029 3.566* .044 
Significant board   .225* .027 .209* .023 0.249† .056 
Profession-related network             
Academic     .575† .092 .622 .164 
Relevant industry     1.024 .954 1.044 .922 
Other industry     .898 .782 .918 .836 
Board structure             
Board size       .960 .436 
Mean board age       .935 .850 
Model Chi-square 7,321  22,081  25,362  25,99  
Model Chi-square significance 0,062  0,001  0,003  0,007  
Delta Model Chi-square   14,761  3,281  0,628  
Delta Model Chi-square significance   0,002  0,35  0,007  
"-2 log likelihood" 78,2  63,44  60,159  59,531  
Hosmer & Lemeshow sig. 0,35  0,607  0,067  0,43  
Overall predictive accuracy 72,90 %  75,70 %  74,30 %  74,30 %  
Cox & Snell R-squared 0,099  0,271  0,304  0,31  
Nagelkerke R-squared 0,141  0,384  0,431  0,44  
†p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0,01 - Model run on 70 firms, 50 failures and 20 successes 
 15 
Significant board experience (7) is seen to 
correlate with variable 5 and 6, and it is 
therefore reasonable to introduce these 
variables in the same block in the regression 
analysis. The profession-related network 
variables relevant (9) and other (10) industry 
both have a positive correlation with 
Significant board experience (7) and Senior 
level management (6). This relationship is 
somewhat expected, as people with executive 
level experience often have been found in a 
specific industry. Board size (11) has a 
significant positive correlation with 6,7,9 and 
10, but not with variable 1. One explanation of 
this might be that boards have a basis number, 
consisting of the founders,  and that a further 
extension of the boards are done with the 
regards to add people with these networks. 
Also, the lack of correlations between board 
size and success might indicate that it is the 
social capital of the board, and not the board 
size that matters.   
 
Following, the overview of the hierarchical 
linear regression model is presented in table 2. 
Model 1 contains the control variables. As we 
can see, Bio/Pharma has the highest 
significance value among the control variables. 
The exp(B)-value of 0,174 indicates that that it 
has a negative influence on the odds for 
success. Founding year seems to have the 
largest positive odds ratio of 1,254, but without 
significance. Again, note that the founding year 
variable is coded as years since incorporation, 
thus the positive coefficient applies to firm age. 
Model 2 demonstrates support for hypothesis 1 
with the strong model significance of 0,001. In 
this model Senior management and Significant 
board experience have significant effects. 
However, where Senior level management 
demonstrates a positive odds ratio of 3,107, 
Significant board experience is seen to have a 
negative influence on the outcome, with an 
odds ratio of 0,225. Entrepreneurial network 
stands out with the highest odds ratio of 6,668, 
but only approaching significance.  
 
Model 3 introduces profession-related 
network. Surprisingly, Academic related 
network has a negative effect on success, and 
approaching significance. As this is the 
opposite of our expectation, and none of the 
other variables are approaching any significant 
values, hypothesis 2 has no support from this 
model. The Pearson correlation matrix shows 
substantial correlation between the variables 
Relevant industrial (9) and Other industrial 
(10) in model 3 and Senior level management 
(6). As described earlier this was expected. 
However, Senior level management (10) is 
upholding its significance levels even though it 
is fairly correlated with the new variables. This 
might indicate that it is the executive part of 
the network and not the specific industry that 
is of importance for success. Although this 
further weakens the hold of hypothesis 2, the 
stability of significance for the variables 4 and 
6 is reassuring for hypothesis 1. Model 4 
includes Board size and Mean board age. None 
of these variables have any significant values. 
However, variable 6 loses a level of significance 
at the inclusion of block 4. This is expected, as 
age can be argued to correlate with board 
experience.  
 
As a Goodness-of-fit assessment we used 
Hosmer & Lemeshow tests12 - which were non-
significant throughout the model, thus 
indicating a model with predictive power. The -
2 log-likelihood statistic13 is a good measure to 
assess the fit of the new step in a model. In our 
case, the -2LL is continuously decreasing for 
each step, indicating that we are improving the 
model.   
 
Following, the results for our second logistic 
regression model, measuring the board right 
before the USOs “end event”, are presented 
below. This model was verified using the same 
tests as above. Although the model overall 
seems to demonstrate significance 14  and a 
goodness-of-fit, there are a number of 
influential outliers15 contained in the sample. 
We have kept these cases in the sample as we 
want the model to act as a descriptive tool in 
assistance to the first regression. In addition, 
there are several methodological weaknesses 
the reader should be aware of. Board members 
who have worked within the focal firm have 
                                                            
12  The Hosmer & Lemeshow statistic tells if the 
observed data are significantly different from the 
predicted values from the model. A non significant 
value is indicative of a model that is predicting the 
real-world data well (Field, 2005). 
13  The log-likelihood is an indicator of how much 
unexplained information there is after the model has 
been fitted. It is based on summing the probabilities 
associated with the predicted and actual outcomes and 
is analogous to the residual sum of squares in multiple 
regression (Field, 2005). The value reported is the log-
likelihood multiplied with -2 in order to get a chi-
squared distribution of the statistic. Thus -2LL. 
14 The model is significant at p<0,001 level at. block 2. 
Increasing to 0,007 in block 4. 
15 In total five cases showed values substantially larger 
than 1 on Cook’s Distance, two variables had a 
normalized residual larger than 3 and four cases had a 
DfBeta substantially larger than 1. 
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been accredited for Relevant industrial 
experience. It is arguable that this gives a 
wrong impression towards inclusion of 
external network, as this is somewhat self-
reinforced. Moreover, as we measure the board 
close to end event, it is possible that board 
changes have happened and that the sitting 
board is not responsible for the event that has 
occurred. Thus, this analysis should not be 
used as a stand-alone model. It is only included 
with the purpose to support the discussion and 
contentions from the first regression. 
 
 
Table 4. Pearson correlation matrix – at event 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  Success (1) 1                       
Control 
variables 
Founding year (2) .138 1           
Software (3) .058 -.073 1          
Bio/Pharma (4) -.259* .077 -.286* 1                 
Executive 
level network 
Entrepreneurial (5) .236* .074 -.055 .028 1        
Senior level mgmt. (6) .509** -.045 .240* -.089 .568** 1       
Significant board (7) .353** .041 .174 -.025 .474** .623** 1           
Profession-
related 
network 
Academic (8) -.129 .003 .113 -.010 .092 .104 -.069 1     
Relevant industrial (9) .322** -.298* .268* .017 .306** .524** .256* .082 1    
Other industrial (10) .400** .064 .094 -.066 .277* .656** .567** .098 .184 1     
Board 
structure 
Board size (11) .339** -.090 .249* -.146 .310** .619** .579** .331** .455** .563** 1   
Mean board age (12) -.135 -.005 -.041 .174 .012 -.072 .115 .109 .058 -.089 .254* 1 
 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 5. Hierarchical logistic regression – at event 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
At founding Exp(B) Sig Exp(B) Sig Exp(B) Sig Exp(B) Sig 
Control variables         
Founding year 1.254 .171 1.499† .097 2.063* .018 2.065* .020 
Software 1.020 .971 .364 .199 .229 .112 .235 .125 
Bio/Pharma .174* .036 .105* .024 .048* .012 .049* .014 
Executive level network                
Entrepreneurial   .600 .574 .285 .292 .287 .315 
Senior level mgmt.   3.592** .003 3.078* .037 3.022† .052 
Significant board   1.135 .687 1.064 .874 1.164 .738 
Profession-related network    !          
Academic     .541 .134 .567 .188 
Relevant industry     2.466* .048 2.512† .058 
Other industry     1.287 .497 1.233 .595 
Board structure    !  !      
Board size       .974 .620 
Mean board age       .987 .973 
         
Model Chi-square 7,321  55,913  37,623  37,915  
Model Chi-square significance 0,062  0,000  0,000  0,000  
Delta Model Chi-square   22,287  8,015  0,292  
Delta Model Chi-square significance   0,000  0,046  0,864  
"-2 log likelihood" 78,2  62,553  47,898  47,606  
Hosmer & Lemeshow sig. 0,706  0,973  0,599  0,733  
Overall predictive accuracy 72,90 %  78,60 %  87,10 %  87,10 %  
Cox & Snell R-squared 0,099  0,345  0,416  0,418  
Nagelkerke R-squared 0,141  0,489  0,59  0,593  
†p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0,01 - Model run on 70 firms, 50 failures and 20 successes 
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Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix 
for our second model. We see how the 
correlations mentioned in the last matrix 
persist. However, there are also a large number 
of new variables with significant correlation 
directly to the success variable. Relevant 
industrial (9), Other industrial (10) and Board 
size are all new and significant at the 0,01 level. 
We will look at how these variables perform 
when controlling for each other in the logistic 
regression, but as a general comment it is 
reassuring that we see a typical stronger 
correlation with the outcome variable in this 
model. As we are close to the end event, we 
expected fewer, unmeasured occurrences to 
intervene with our sample, increasing 
predictive power.  
 
The second logistic regression model shows 
three major changes in significance and effect 
for the individual variables. The Senior level 
management variable is now significant at a 
p<0,01 level, and Relevant industry also shows 
significant and positive effects towards success. 
However, Entrepreneurial network has lost 
both its significant values and effect - an 
evident change. This may be seen as a result of 
how the needs of USOs differ in the different 
stages in a start-up process, and thus indicate 
the differences within the different networks.  
 
In opposition to the first analysis, it would be 
relevant to control for events occurring during 
the lifespan of the USOs. Some typical control 
variables are the receiving of VC-funds, 
number of employees, region and change in 
region. VC-funds was expected to have the 
largest predictive power of outcome, hence it 
was included in our initial analysis. However, 
as it correlates perfectly with the Bio/Pharma 
variable, we experienced discrimination 
problems, which collapsed the model. We 
performed analysis using one variable at a time 
and discovered that the predictive effect was 
somewhat larger with Bio/Pharma. Due to this, 
and that we wanted to keep our model 
constant, we decided to not include VC-
funding as control, and given the correlation 
with Bio/Pharma this is not considered a 
significant weakness. The variables that were 
mentioned but not included were tested in 
separate regressions. Neither showed any 
predictive power, and was thus left out. 
 
In summary, our first regression model shows 
how USOs having board members with 
network related to entrepreneurial or senior 
management positions in their initial phase are 
more likely to achieve success, thus supporting 
hypothesis 1. Significant board experience 
however, was shown to have a negative effect 
on the outcome of the USO. There was no 
support for hypothesis 2 and 3. The second 
regression model supports the importance of 
senior level network also in later stages of the 
USOs development. The decrease of the odds 
ratio and significance for the Entrepreneurial 
variable and increase for Industrial-variables 
are indicative of a change in needs in the USOs 
over time. These different needs might be 
reflected in the differences of these two types of 
networks. In addition, it proves there are 
differences in the benefits contained in the 
different networks. 
 
Discussion 
In this paper, we sought to explore the initial 
board of directors’ effect on USO performance. 
The role of directors as a firm’s source to board 
capital has received considerable research 
attention, however, the board of directors in 
the context of USOs has only recently come to 
the forefront. To advance this stream of work, 
we provide a deeper understanding of the type 
of prior network contributing to success during 
the founding phase. Drawing on board capital 
theory, we studied the board characteristics at 
founding in relation to success. Our findings 
indicate that the accumulated board capital of 
the board of directors’ influences the success 
rate of USOs, suggesting that a board can use 
our following findings to determine the type of 
board members needed to be added. 
Furthermore, a noteworthy finding of our 
study is the lack of effect of board size and 
average board member age, hence indicating 
that further research should focus more on 
board members’ prior network, network 
capabilities and experience when investigating 
boards role in the context of USO performance. 
 
Executive level network 
Hypothesis 1: Presence of executive network 
for the initial board of directors increases the 
likelihood of success for USOs. 
 
This section outlines the effect entrepreneurial 
-, senior level management -, and significant 
board experience have on USO performance. 
Our findings show that the presence of 
executive networks at founding increases the 
likelihood of success. 
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Entrepreneurial related network 
Our findings indicate that presence of 
entrepreneurial experience in the board 
increases the odds for success. Entrepreneurial 
experience is valuable for USOs. Habitual 
entrepreneurs are strategic regarding the new 
ties they wish to build. They are active towards 
filling resource gaps within their ventures by 
using their existing social capital to build 
relationships and ties (Mosey & Wright, 2007). 
Thus, boards with elements of entrepreneurial 
experience are more strategic in building new 
ties, or leveraging the results of prior 
established ties, actively bridging the structural 
holes USOs are facing (Grandi & Grimaldi, 
2003; Mosey & Wright, 2007). Experienced 
entrepreneurs often work continuously on 
maintaining established relationships. This 
equips boards with the ability to, seen in a 
timely perspective, gain access to the right 
resources to enhance USO growth. This is also 
supported by Greve (1995). He found that 
habitual entrepreneurs have a larger amount of 
non-redundant ties, thus connecting the 
entrepreneur with other clusters with non-
redundant information.  
 
Our analysis indicates that USOs are in need of 
different types of network, depending on the 
maturity of the firm. As an example, 
entrepreneurial network increased the odds for 
success if it was present at the initial phase for 
USOs. However, in later stages for USOs, 
entrepreneurial network did not have any 
positive influence towards the outcome. This 
may indicate how USOs have special needs in 
the initial phase, and that entrepreneurs have 
these exact capabilities, which are necessary 
early on. As they govern their networks based 
on trust rather than formal contracts, they are 
able to gain credibility in a quicker fashion and 
may possess the ability to turn borrowed 
network ties into their own. This is also 
supported by Mosey and Wright (2007) who 
found how habitual entrepreneurs are able to 
connect with a larger number of external actors 
due to their social capital.  
 
Senior level management  
Senior level management experience is seen to 
have a positive effect towards USOs outcome. 
This effect was present in both analyses. We 
contend that these results indicate that the 
benefits contained by this type of network exist 
throughout the lifetime of the firm. 
 
Board members with prior network from 
senior level management positions provide 
USOs with a structural position, where timely 
access to ideas and knowledge needed for 
problem solving, is present (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009). This is in line with 
Burt’s (2002) theories of structural holes, and 
how social capital links USOs to clusters of 
additive information. By having these ties, 
board members are interacting with decision 
makers, and can more easily obtain the 
resources needed for USO growth. Senior 
management positions normally offer 
legitimacy in the market. As Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) stated, prestigious persons on 
a board provide value confirmation to the 
market. Hence, board members with senior 
management experience may help USOs to 
pass the credibility threshold (Vohora, Wright, 
& Lockett, 2004). This separates the roles for 
entrepreneurial background and senior 
management background in USO boards. 
Where entrepreneurial experience help boards 
find and build strategic ties to potential 
sponsors, senior management experience can 
equip boards with legitimacy and offer benefits 
from their prior ties to decision makers. The 
ties are not guaranteed to be non-redundant, 
but may prove fruitful if the connected actors 
can offer benefits. However, if a board member 
has performed remarkably well as an 
entrepreneur it is likely to contend that it has 
provided him/her with both legitimacy and 
valuable ties.  
 
Drawing on Vohora et al.’s (2004) critical 
junctures, USOs are dependent on prior 
network from senior management experience 
during the establishment and growth phases. 
These board members can pass the threshold 
of credibility by using their pre-existing 
network, which help USOs to develop fast. 
However, to pass the threshold of 
sustainability, prior industrial experience is 
important (Boeker, 1997; Spender, 1989). The 
USO has proven itself, gained legitimacy, and 
is developing into a sustainable firm. In this 
state, USOs have to continuously reconfigure 
existing resources and capabilities with new 
information, knowledge and resources (Vohora 
et al., 2004). According to our findings, board 
members with senior management experience 
tend to also have experience within the 
relevant industry of the USO. It might indicate 
that many of these Norwegian USOs might 
have been fairly selective in the choosing of 
board members. As we have some indications 
to that this relevant industrial experience is 
contributing positively in the later stages, this 
might be favourable behaviour.  
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Significant board experience 
Our results suggest that having board members 
with significant board experience in the initial 
phase is affecting USOs success negatively. 
Carpenter and Westphal (2001) and Carter and 
Lorsch (2004) came to the same conclusions. 
Board members serving on several boards may 
not be able to devote the same attention to 
USOs as a board member serving exclusively 
on a single board. Overly occupied board 
members tend to learn little about the firm’s 
strategic and governance problems to 
contribute effectively. It might also be the 
institutional link serial board members 
possess. For USOs, board members with 
significant board experience are often 
connected to TTOs, and it can be argued that 
these board members are not contributing to a 
non-redundant network. They are working 
closely with the academic institutions, which 
might indicate that they fail to bridge the USOs 
with commercial actors.  
 
However, as with entrepreneurial experience, 
significant board experience is not shown to 
have any effect on the outcome when 
measuring at a later stage of the firms’ 
development. This can be explained by the 
differences in needs for adolescent and mature 
USOs. Kor and Sundaramurthy’s (2009) 
findings on interlocking directorships, 
elucidating the positive effects of having ties to 
other board members, indicate that inclusion 
of these board members should result in 
positive outcomes for mature USOs. Although 
the literature is somewhat contradictory on 
this topic we may contend that the reason for 
the negative effect in the initial phase has 
something to do with how these board 
members are used to govern their network ties 
for the benefit of the USO. Board members 
with significant board experience may not be 
able to contribute sufficiently for small firms, 
while for bigger entities they can use their 
network to further grow the firm. USOs are 
legal entities with self-developed culture, 
routines and processes that persist 
independently of individual employees. They 
also have an externally perceived status (Stuart 
& Sorenson, 2007), which all together may 
attract and facilitate new network ties (Fischer 
& Våge, 2013). Board members with experience 
from large established firms may be 
accustomed to the existence of established 
processes and routines to contain and maintain 
new ties. Early-stage USOs however, may lack 
these routines, and are thus not able to extract 
the full potential of these ties without follow-up 
from these board members. It is also possible 
that the board members underestimate the 
needs for USOs in early phases to be dynamic 
and rapid in their network expansion. 
 
Profession-related network 
Hypothesis 2: Presence of profession related 
network for the initial board of directors 
increases the likelihood of success for USOs. 
 
A noteworthy remark from the findings is the 
lack of significance for relevant industry 
network and success, hence not finding 
support for hypothesis 2. The literature agrees 
largely on the benefits obtained by having 
boards containing industry-related network 
(Johnson et al., 2013; Kor, 2003; Pfeffer, 
1972). Greve (1995) emphasized the 
importance of having a large share of 
professionals in one’s network. He argued that 
to obtain this, a professional background was 
important. An industry’s development in 
regards to technology, competition, and 
regulations is also broadly discussed (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009), claiming that 
knowledge of prior industry conditions can 
help firms understand the industry’s current 
dynamics. By having ties to such expertise is 
hence an advantage for USOs. A characteristic 
found in our sample is that successful USOs 
have board members with industry experience 
at the event stage. This finding concurs with 
Kor (2009). As mentioned, USOs are at this 
stage in their entrance to maturity, identified 
by stronger cash flows and resource allocation 
decisions focused on expansion within the 
chosen domain (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 
2001).  This is in accord with the capabilities of 
persons with industrial related network (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009).  
 
Our findings indicate that industry-related 
network is not crucial for USOs in their initial 
phase. During founding it is of more value to 
have a board member with prior senior 
management and entrepreneurial experience. 
Industry experience may not be as important 
for USOs because of their dependency on 
establishing linkages to a variety of external 
actors. Many USOs are not in a position to sell 
the industry yet. They are extremely dependent 
on acquiring financial support, because of their 
need to develop their product, and industry 
experience do not normally bring network ties 
towards financial actors or other instrumental 
resources. Mosey and Wright (2007) support 
this finding, observing the lack of influence of 
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prior industry experience on the capability to 
build ties outside the research network.  
 
Board structure 
Hypothesis 3: Higher average board member 
age and board size increase the likelihood of 
success for USOs. 
 
Researchers have agreed on a connection 
between board size and linkages to external 
environment (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 
1972), giving legitimacy to USOs. We found 
however, no significance to underpin this 
hypothesis. Walter et al. (2006) argue through 
their study that it is rather the network 
capabilities, and not the existence of a network 
that affect the performance of USOs. In our 
USO sample, the majority of board members 
are related to the academic institution. As 
discussed earlier, they normally possess a 
dense network, with strong ties to a research 
environment, and are thus failing to gap the 
structural holes separating the USO from 
potential commercial actors.  
 
We can see similarities to the section regarding 
significant board experience. Although a board 
consists of additional members, they fail to 
convert their personal ties to USO benefits due 
to their redundant network. If the board lacks 
the capabilities to obtain and maintain network 
ties, the presence of redundant ties are of little 
use. 
 
Hypothesis 3 also states that the average board 
member age increases the likelihood of success 
for USOs. This hypothesis was rooted in the 
assumption that a higher average age will 
positively vary with the degree of experience. 
Platt and Platt’s (2012) found that a lower 
average age for the board of directors increased 
the likelihood of bankruptcy. Older board 
members will normally have a larger network, 
due to their prior experience. It was however, 
not found support for this hypothesis. We 
argue that high age in general translates to 
more experience, but that it is not the amount 
of experience that bridge the structural holes 
for USOs. For USOs to gain access to 
commercial benefits, the right prior network is 
necessary. Hence, we argue that a board 
without senior management or entrepreneurial 
experience, will not perform better, although it 
constitutes additional members, or have a 
higher average age. 
 
 
 
Introducing the model 
This section presents our model, based on the 
abovementioned findings on senior 
management and entrepreneurial networks. 
Figure 7 represents the initial network USOs 
are faced with. They usually have strong ties to 
their parent university, the affiliated TTO and 
actors within their research environment. 
These ties give access to research facilities and 
other benefits, mentioned earlier, but usually 
fail to bridge the USO to commercial actors.  
 
By having board members with senior level 
network, USOs are provided with legitimacy 
towards external actors. In addition, they can 
provide the USO with pre-existing ties, 
bridging structural holes, thus obtaining a 
structurally beneficial position in a network. 
This is shown in figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 7. Initial network for USOs 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Influence of senior management network 
 
A board with senior level network is easier to 
perceive as credible, given their professional 
background, and may provide a connection to 
financial resources. These members also often 
possess the industrial capabilities needed in a 
maturing stage where the USOs focus more on 
within-domain expansion and productivity 
enhancement. A board should hence always 
strive for new members with such professional 
background. 
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Figure 9. Influence of senior management- and 
entrepreneurial network 
 
A problem arises when the board’s senior 
management network do not possess ties to a 
specific market. To be connected to the 
preferred cluster, the USO has to actively 
bridge the structural hole. Habitual 
entrepreneurs are found to be strategic in 
building new ties, and our model suggest that 
boards with prior entrepreneurial experience 
are better to guide USOs in the process of 
acquiring beneficial ties. This is seen in figure 
9, where the entrepreneur is able to convert 
indirect ties to strong ties. Our paper states 
that boards with entrepreneurial experience, 
combined with prior senior management 
network are beneficial in acquiring the needed 
benefits for USOs during early stage, and USOs 
should focus on adding board members 
constituting such experience. 
 
Implications and 
further research 
This section presents implications of the 
findings presented in this paper. We contend 
that this will provide value to academic 
entrepreneurs, USOs, TTOs, researchers and 
other policymakers.  
 
Entrepreneurs/USOs 
The direct implications for academic 
entrepreneurs and USOs revolve around the 
composition of their board of directors. As 
stated by Fischer and Våge (2013), USOs 
should strive for a non-redundant network, 
characterized by strong ties governed by trust. 
We build on this and contend, in a more 
specific way, how to achieve this. Academic 
entrepreneurs and USOs should build their 
boards proactively to construct a network for 
bridging structural holes. This should be done 
early, by building semi internal knowledge 
reservoirs (Widding, 2005). To avoid getting 
dependent on specific partners, their focus 
should be on shifting borrowed indirect ties 
into strong ties. As persons with senior 
management experience are likely to bring 
with them pre-existing ties, they should aim to 
include these early on. In addition, boards with 
entrepreneurial experience may have the 
capabilities needed to turn borrowed 
hierarchical ties into strong personal ties. 
People with entrepreneurial background have 
the largest effect during the founding stages of 
the firm, and should thus be included as early 
as possible. USOs should include persons with 
relevant industrial experience when the 
opportunity arrives. Further, the network 
structure and the structural holes it spans 
should be the focus, not the size of the boards. 
 
TTO 
TTOs are often the first strong tie for new 
established USOs, and normally act as 
sponsors. In addition, they are a primary 
source for potential board members at 
incorporation. One of the main tasks for TTOs 
is to provide and maintain an advantageous 
network for USOs. In order to facilitate further 
creation of strong ties, and prevent dependency 
for the USO, it is important that the TTO fulfils 
their role as a facilitator in the right fashion. 
They should provide and support USOs with 
new ties, and then let them develop these ties 
themselves. This will prevent the creation of 
hierarchical structured networks.  
 
Another issue, discussed earlier, is the 
institutional link TTOs have. They are working 
closely with the institutions, and might 
contribute with a redundant network, ranging 
mainly the research environment. It is thus 
important that TTOs offer commercial links for 
USOs, to connect them to commercial actors. 
We argue that TTOs, contributing with senior 
level management and entrepreneurial 
experience, will have a bigger influence on USO 
performance. 
 
Researchers 
Our findings support that boards with 
entrepreneurial experience at founding 
enhance the performance of USOs. Mosey and 
Wright’s (2007) study showed the same results 
for entrepreneurs in the management team, 
pointing on the positive effect of 
entrepreneurial experience. Similarities were 
also observed between the studies with 
relevance to prior industrial experience, 
enlightening the lack of effect this experience 
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has towards performance. As the results from 
these types of studies show equal results, one 
implication may be that it is possible to 
operationalize findings regarding 
entrepreneurial network to also be valid for 
board’s network.  
 
Furthermore, the entrepreneur and the board 
possess some of the same characteristics, and 
we imply that the board can be used as a 
toolbox for entrepreneurs in the management 
team,  
to acquire resources and information not 
present in the team. This builds on Widding’s 
(2005) theory on knowledge reservoirs. Using 
the same argument as earlier, findings 
regarding one of these subjects can be 
operationalized to also be valid for the other. 
 
Using LinkedIn, and other open databases on 
the Internet, is a new method of data 
gathering. If our findings prove to be fruitful, 
researchers can adopt our method of 
operationalizing social capital with prior 
experience in other studies. By choosing a 
mature sample, ranging from 1999 to 2004, we 
assume that the available data on LinkedIn and 
Google will increase by the years, making our 
data collection method more accurate for 
future researchers. 
 
Further research 
Our study is not without limitations, and there 
are areas for further research. We analyse 
solely Norwegian USOs. Further researchers 
could extend and apply our research to other 
nations, to control for differences. The role of 
venture capital firms is bigger in the US than in 
Norway, and VC funding could hence be an 
indicator for success. Also, we observed USOs 
from two time events only, namely at founding 
and at event. Future research could be 
extended to take a longitudinal study, focusing 
on how changes of the board affect the 
performance, and to separate the types of 
networks that are important at different stages. 
To know when to include the different types of 
networks in the board of directors would be 
very valuable for the growth USOs. A way to do 
this could be to code the board composition for 
each year, over a time span of 8 to 10 years, 
and see how the characteristics of the boards 
change for successful firms. 
 
Our findings suggest that board members with 
senior management experience tend to also 
have experience within the relevant industry of 
the USO, and that industry experience is 
favourable in later stages of the firm. However, 
we have not controlled for the distribution of 
these traits within the board itself. If the traits 
registered for a board were possessed by only a 
single person, it might yield different results 
relative to evenly distributed traits. 
Furthermore, we have not separated between 
inside and outside directors. Also, as 
mentioned in our second regression analysis, 
we have not distinguished between work 
experience in the focal firm versus other 
firms.  As there are clearly differences between 
insiders and outsiders, it would be fruitful to 
separate them to uncover the best board 
characteristics for USO success. We also note 
that the dependent variable can be hard to 
capture empirically. There are several factors 
that influences USO performance. It would be 
interesting to test our results on other 
dependent variables, such as CEO replacement, 
which is more affected by boards. 
 
Another point concerns control variable. Our 
findings suggest that Bio/Pharma as a control 
variable is of relevance, as the 
commercialization period is found to be slower 
for USOs operating in that sector. Interestingly 
however, is the use of software as a control 
variable. Researchers before have found that 
the commercialization period for software is 
shorter than average. This was not found in our 
sample, and attention should be given to 
validate this. Additionally, we found that only 1 
of the 70 USOs in our sample changed location 
during our time interval. It would be 
interesting to investigate through a qualitative 
analysis why so few USOs stick to their 
originated location, even though many of them 
do not achieve success. Moreover, people who 
have been working at technology transfer 
offices for a longer period will often be 
involved in enough boards to be accounted for 
significant board experience. This board 
experience was discovered to be 
disadvantageous in the initial phase of USOs. 
As it is plausible that a large part of these 
board members stem from TTOs, an 
interesting subject for further research is to 
examine the number of TTO employees in the 
boards and control for this in a similar analysis 
as conducted in this paper.  
 
At last, our new method of data gathering, 
using LinkedIn and other open databases on 
the Internet, is an area open for further 
inspection. The information available here, is 
partly submitted by the person it regards, 
which can look similar to a general survey. 
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However, the information is submitted with a 
personal agenda, rather than to support a 
scholar’s research. This can indicate that the 
data has some risks towards being biased. A 
study comparing the information found on the 
Internet, compared to regular survey data, 
could assess the likelihood of the online 
information being correct and unbiased. Also, 
in regards to our operationalization of network 
using experience, one could try to directly 
measure the network by using LinkedIn, and 
compare the results to see if our 
operationalization is valid. 
 
Conclusion 
This study indicates through empirical findings 
that the initial characteristics of the board 
affect university spin-off companies’ 
performance. Our findings highlight that 
successful USOs consists of board members 
with senior level management and 
entrepreneurial experience that help connect 
them non-redundant networks. Senior level 
management experience contributes with ties 
to relevant external actors. They provide 
legitimacy in the market and provide timely 
information to induce USO growth. 
Entrepreneurial experience provides skills to 
target the right actors when needed. They use 
their prior experience to guide USOs during 
the founding stage, where right decisions are 
crucial for future success.  
 
Furthermore, our study has shown that a board 
member with prior board experience does not 
affect the performance of USOs. We argue that 
board members, occupied by positions in other 
boards will not be able to devote the preferred 
attention to the USO. They are also often 
connected to TTOs, and are not contributing to 
a non-redundant network. Neither did we find 
any indications that board members with prior 
industrial experience affect USO performance. 
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Appendix 1 - Codebook 
 
Codebook - Firm Overview 
Variable 
SPSS Variable 
Name Coding instructions Measure'
Firm data   !
fornyid fornyid uniqe ID from FORNY database Nominal!
Founding year foundyear Year of founding Scale!
Software software  Nominal!
Bio/Pharma biopharma  Nominal!
TTO/University ttouni  Nominal!
Events     !!
Acquisition acq Year of acquisition Scale!
Acquisition success acqsuccess Dummy variable. 1 = Acquired Nominal!
Venture Capital vc Year of VC investment Scale!
Venture Capital BIN vcbin Dummy variable. 1 = recieved venture capital Nominal!
Failure failure Year of Failure Scale!
Development     !!
Result result Operating income in 2012 Scale!
Revenue revenue Revenue in 2012 Scale!
Money success moneysuccess Dummy variable. 1 = success by 
abovementioned 
Nominal!
Success success Dummy variable. 1 if acqsuccess or 
moneysuccess 
Nominal!
   !
Codebook - Person registe: At founding (af), equal for "at event (ae)" 
Non important afpXnonimp Dummy variable. 1 = non important person Nominal!
Relevant Industrial afpXindustrial Dummy variable. 1 = relevant industrial 
experience 
Nominal!
Other industrual afpXother Dummy variable. 1 = other industrial 
experience 
Nominal!
Academic afpXacademic Dummy variable. 1 = academic experience Nominal!
Entrepreneurial afpXentr Dummy variable. 1 = entrepreneurial 
experience 
Nominal!
Senior management afpXsenior Dummy variable. 1 = senior management 
exp. 
Nominal!
Significant board 
experience 
afpXsignboard Dummy variable. 1 = significant board exp. Nominal!
Age afpXage Age at founding (af) and at event (ae) Scale!
   !
Codebook - Person and Firm aggregates 
Non important afSUMnonimp Sum of board members with afpXnonimp Scale!
Relevant Industrial afSUMindustrial Sum of board members with afpXindustrial Scale!
Other industrual afSUMother Sum of board members with afpXother Scale!
Academic afSUMacademic Sum of board members with afpXacademic Scale!
Entrepreneurial afSUMentr Sum of board members with afpXentr Scale!
Senior management afSUMsenior Sum of board members with afpXsenior Scale!
Significant board 
experience 
afSUMsignboard Sum of board members with afpXsignboard Scale!
Age afSUMage Average age of board members Scale!
   !
Region region Region where USO is registered: Nord, Sør, 
Øst, Vest, Midt, Oslo 
Nominal!
Age of firm firmage Years since USO was incorporated Scale!
Board members afSUMboard Number of boardmembers at founding and 
event 
Scale!
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Appendix 3 – Summary script 
 
The following script was used to gather data from the 70 different templates into one master-file 
containing the whole sample.  
 
Sub Superfischscript() 
 
    Dim Summary As Worksheet 
    Dim FolderPath As String 
    Dim NRow As Integer 
    Dim WorkBk As Workbook 
    Dim SourceRange1 As Range   'Firm 
    Dim SourceRange2 As Range   'Orgnr 
    Dim SourceRange3 As Range   'FornyID 
    Dim SourceRange4 As Range   'Foundingyear 
    Dim SourceRange5 As Range   'TTO/University 
    Dim SourceRange6 As Range   'Software 
    Dim SourceRange7 As Range  'Bio/Pharma 
    Dim SourceRange8 As Range   'Acq 
    Dim SourceRange9 As Range   'Acq cmt 
    Dim SourceRange10 As Range   'Failure 
    Dim SourceRange11 As Range  'Failure cmt 
    Dim SourceRange12 As Range  'VC 
    Dim SourceRange13 As Range  'VC cmt 
    Dim SourceRange14 As Range  'Revenue 
    Dim SourceRange15 As Range  'Revenue cmt 
    Dim SourceRange16 As Range  'Result 
    Dim SourceRange17 As Range  'Result cmt 
     
     
     
    Dim SourceRange21 As Range  'AFP1 
    Dim SourceRange22 As Range  'AFP2 
    Dim SourceRange23 As Range  'AFP3 
    Dim SourceRange24 As Range  'AFP4 
    Dim SourceRange25 As Range  'AFP5 
    Dim SourceRange26 As Range  'AFP6 
    Dim SourceRange27 As Range  'AFP7 
    Dim SourceRange28 As Range  'AFP8 
    Dim SourceRange29 As Range  'AFP9 
    Dim SourceRange30 As Range  'AFP10 
     
    Dim SourceRange31 As Range  'AEP1 
    Dim SourceRange32 As Range  'AEP2 
    Dim SourceRange33 As Range  'AEP3 
    Dim SourceRange34 As Range  'AEP4 
    Dim SourceRange35 As Range  'AEP5 
    Dim SourceRange36 As Range  'AEP6 
    Dim SourceRange37 As Range  'AEP7 
    Dim SourceRange38 As Range  'AEP8 
    Dim SourceRange39 As Range  'AEP9 
    Dim SourceRange40 As Range  'AEP10 
 
    Dim DestRange1 As Range     'Firm 
    Dim DestRange2 As Range     ' 
    Dim DestRange3 As Range     ' 
    Dim DestRange4 As Range     ' 
    Dim DestRange5 As Range     ' 
    Dim DestRange6 As Range     ' 
    Dim DestRange7 As Range     ' 
    Dim DestRange8 As Range     ' 
    Dim DestRange9 As Range     ' 
    Dim DestRange10 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange11 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange12 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange13 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange14 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange15 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange16 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange17 As Range    'Result cmt 
     
    Dim DestRange21 As Range    'AFP1 
    Dim DestRange22 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange23 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange24 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange25 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange26 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange27 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange28 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange29 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange30 As Range    ' 
     
    Dim DestRange31 As Range    'AEP1 
    Dim DestRange32 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange33 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange34 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange35 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange36 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange37 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange38 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange39 As Range    ' 
    Dim DestRange40 As Range    ' 
     
    Dim FornyId As String 
    Dim SpacePos As Integer 
    Dim SpacePos2 As Integer 
    Dim FirmName As String 
    Dim FullFileName As String 
    Dim NumberOfFiles As Integer 
     
    ' Create a new workbook and set a variable to the first sheet. 
    Set Summary = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1) 
    Summary.Name = "Summary Sheet" 
     
    'Lets the user select a file in the desired folder 
    FolderPath = GetFolderPath() 
     
    ' NRow keeps track of where to insert new rows in the destination workbook. 
    NRow = 1 
     
    'Count number of files in folder 
    'NB: Make shure there are no other files in the folder than FORNY-coded templates 
    NumberOfFiles = CountFilesInFolder(FolderPath) 
     
    'Loop over all files in folder 
    Do While NRow <= NumberOfFiles 
 
        'Get filename 
        FullFileName = GetFirmName(NRow, FolderPath) 
         
        ' Open a workbook in the folder 
        Set WorkBk = Workbooks.Open(FolderPath & FullFileName) 
         
        ' Set the source range 
        Set SourceRange1 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B2")    'Firm 
        Set SourceRange2 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B3") 
        Set SourceRange3 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B4") 
        Set SourceRange4 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B7")     'Founding year 
        Set SourceRange5 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B8") 
        Set SourceRange6 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B9") 
        Set SourceRange7 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B10")      'Bio/pharma 
        Set SourceRange8 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B13")      'Acq 
        Set SourceRange9 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("C13") 
        Set SourceRange10 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B14")   'Failure 
        Set SourceRange11 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("C14") 
        Set SourceRange12 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B15")   'VC 
        Set SourceRange13 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("C15") 
        Set SourceRange14 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B16")   'Revenue 
        Set SourceRange15 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("C16") 
        Set SourceRange16 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("B17")   'Result 
        Set SourceRange17 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("C17") 
         
        Set SourceRange21 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A20:M20")   'AFP1 
        Set SourceRange22 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A21:M21")   'AFP2 
        Set SourceRange23 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A22:M22")   'AFP3 
        Set SourceRange24 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A23:M23")   'AFP4 
        Set SourceRange25 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A24:M24")   'AFP5 
        Set SourceRange26 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A25:M25")   'AFP6 
        Set SourceRange27 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A26:M26")   'AFP7 
        Set SourceRange28 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A27:M27")   'AFP8 
        Set SourceRange29 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A28:M28")   'AFP9 
        Set SourceRange30 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A29:M29")   'AFP10 
         
        Set SourceRange31 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A32:M32")   'AEP1 
        Set SourceRange32 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A33:M33")   'AEP2 
        Set SourceRange33 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A34:M34")   'AEP3 
        Set SourceRange34 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A35:M35")   'AEP4 
        Set SourceRange35 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A36:M36")   'AEP5 
        Set SourceRange36 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A37:M37")   'AEP6 
        Set SourceRange37 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A38:M38")   'AEP7 
        Set SourceRange38 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A39:M39")   'AEP8 
        Set SourceRange39 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A40:M40")   'AEP9 
        Set SourceRange40 = WorkBk.Worksheets(1).Range("A41:M41")   'AEP10 
               
        ' Set the destination range 
        Set DestRange1 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("A" & NRow + 1)   'Firm 
        Set DestRange2 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("B" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange3 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("C" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange4 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("D" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange5 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("E" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange6 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("F" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange7 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("G" & NRow + 1)  'Bio/Pharma 
        Set DestRange8 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("H" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange9 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("I" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange10 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("J" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange11 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("K" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange12 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("L" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange13 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("M" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange14 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("N" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange15 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("O" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange16 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("P" & NRow + 1) 
        Set DestRange17 = ThisWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Range("Q" & NRow + 1) 
         
        Set DestRange21 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 18), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 30))        'AFP1 
        Set DestRange22 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 31), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 43))        
'AFP2 
        Set DestRange23 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 44), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 56))        
'AFP3 
        Set DestRange24 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 57), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 69))        
'AFP4 
        Set DestRange25 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 70), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 82))        
'AFP5 
        Set DestRange26 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 83), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 95))        
'AFP6 
        Set DestRange27 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 96), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 108))        
'AFP7 
        Set DestRange28 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 109), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 121))      
'AFP8 
        Set DestRange29 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 122), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 134))        
'AFP9 
        Set DestRange30 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 135), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 147))      
'AFP10 
         
        Set DestRange31 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 148), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 160))        
'AEP1 
        Set DestRange32 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 161), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 173))        
'AEP2 
        Set DestRange33 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 174), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 186))        
'AEP3 
        Set DestRange34 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 187), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 199))        
'AEP4 
        Set DestRange35 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 200), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 212))        
'AEP5 
        Set DestRange36 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 213), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 225))        
'AEP6 
        Set DestRange37 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 226), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 238))        
'AEP7 
        Set DestRange38 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 239), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 251))        
'AEP8 
        Set DestRange39 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 252), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 264))        
'AEP9 
        Set DestRange40 = Summary.Range(Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 265), Summary.Cells(NRow + 1, 277))        
'AEP10 
         
        ' Copy over the values from the source to the destination. 
        DestRange1.Value = SourceRange1.Value   'Firm 
        DestRange2.Value = SourceRange2.Value 
        DestRange3.Value = SourceRange3.Value 
        DestRange4.Value = SourceRange4.Value 
        DestRange5.Value = SourceRange5.Value 
        DestRange6.Value = SourceRange6.Value 
        DestRange7.Value = SourceRange7.Value 
        DestRange8.Value = SourceRange8.Value 
        DestRange9.Value = SourceRange9.Value 
        DestRange10.Value = SourceRange10.Value 
        DestRange11.Value = SourceRange11.Value 
        DestRange12.Value = SourceRange12.Value 
        DestRange13.Value = SourceRange13.Value 
        DestRange14.Value = SourceRange14.Value 
        DestRange15.Value = SourceRange15.Value 
        DestRange16.Value = SourceRange16.Value 
        DestRange17.Value = SourceRange16.Value 
         
        DestRange21.Value = SourceRange21.Value        'AFP1 
        DestRange22.Value = SourceRange22.Value        'AFP2 
        DestRange23.Value = SourceRange23.Value        'AFP3 
        DestRange24.Value = SourceRange24.Value        'AFP4 
        DestRange25.Value = SourceRange25.Value        'AFP5 
        DestRange26.Value = SourceRange26.Value        'AFP6 
        DestRange27.Value = SourceRange27.Value        'AFP7 
        DestRange28.Value = SourceRange28.Value        'AFP8 
        DestRange29.Value = SourceRange29.Value        'AFP9 
        DestRange30.Value = SourceRange30.Value        'AFP10 
 
        DestRange31.Value = SourceRange31.Value        'AEP1 
        DestRange32.Value = SourceRange32.Value        'AEP2 
        DestRange33.Value = SourceRange33.Value        'AEP3 
        DestRange34.Value = SourceRange34.Value        'AEP4 
        DestRange35.Value = SourceRange35.Value        'AEP5 
        DestRange36.Value = SourceRange36.Value        'AEP6 
        DestRange37.Value = SourceRange37.Value        'AEP7 
        DestRange38.Value = SourceRange38.Value        'AEP8 
        DestRange39.Value = SourceRange39.Value        'AEP9 
        DestRange40.Value = SourceRange40.Value        'AEP10 
         
        ' Increase NRow to move to next row and next file in folder 
        NRow = NRow + 1 
         
        ' Close the source workbook without saving changes. 
        WorkBk.Close savechanges:=False 
         
    Loop 
     
    ' Call AutoFit on the destination sheet so that all data is readable. 
    Sheet1.Columns.AutoFit 
 
End Sub 
 
Function GetFirmName(NumberInFolder As Integer, Folder As String) As String 
 
        Dim ScriptToGetFirmName As String 
         
        ScriptToGetFirmName = "Tell application ""Finder""" & Chr(13) 
        ScriptToGetFirmName = ScriptToGetFirmName & "activate" & Chr(13) 
        ScriptToGetFirmName = ScriptToGetFirmName & "get name of file " & NumberInFolder & " of alias " & 
Chr(34) & Folder & Chr(34) & Chr(13) 
        ScriptToGetFirmName = ScriptToGetFirmName & "end tell" 
 
        GetFirmName = MacScript(ScriptToGetFirmName) 
         
End Function 
 
 
Function CountFilesInFolder(Folder As String) As Integer 
 
Dim ScriptToCountFilesInFolder As String 
 
ScriptToCountFilesInFolder = "Tell application ""Finder""" & Chr(13) 
ScriptToCountFilesInFolder = ScriptToCountFilesInFolder & "activate" & Chr(13) 
ScriptToCountFilesInFolder = ScriptToCountFilesInFolder & "count every file in alias " & Chr(34) & Folder & 
Chr(34) & Chr(13) 
ScriptToCountFilesInFolder = ScriptToCountFilesInFolder & "end tell" 
 
CountFilesInFolder = MacScript(ScriptToCountFilesInFolder) 
 
End Function 
 
Function GetFolderPath() As String 
 
Dim ScriptToGetFolderPath As String 
 
ScriptToGetFolderPath = "Tell application ""Finder""" & Chr(13) 
ScriptToGetFolderPath = ScriptToGetFolderPath & "set pathToMe to (choose file with prompt ""Select file in :"")" 
& Chr(13) 
ScriptToGetFolderPath = ScriptToGetFolderPath & "tell application ""Finder"" to return container of pathToMe 
as text" & Chr(13) 
ScriptToGetFolderPath = ScriptToGetFolderPath & "end tell" 
 
GetFolderPath = MacScript(ScriptToGetFolderPath) 
 
End Function 
 
Sub XResetSheet() 
 
ActiveWorkbook.Worksheets(1).Delete 
 
Sheets.Add 
 
End Sub 
 
  
Appendix 4 – Variable overview 
 
 
  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable SPSSname N Min. Max. Mean Std.Dev. Var. 
Founding year foundyear  1995 2004 2001.21 1.710 2.924 
Years since 
founding firmage 
 10 19 12.79 1.710 2.924 
At founding  70      
Industrial afSUMindustrial  0 5 1.00 1.116 1.246 
Other ind. afSUMother  0 4 1.19 1.094 1.197 
Academic afSUMacademic  0 5 1.10 1.144 1.309 
Entrpreneurial afSUMentr  0 2 .19 .460 .211 
Senior mgmt.. afSUMsenior  0 4 .96 .999 .998 
Sign. board afSUMsignboard  0 3 .67 .775 .601 
# of board 
members afSUMboard 
 2 8 4.30 1.376 1.894 
Mean board 
member age afNEWFIRMage 
 22.8 59.3 45.477 6.7400 45.428 
At event  70      
Industrial aeSUMindustrial  0 4 1.07 1.220 1.488 
Other ind. aeSUMother  0 5 1.36 1.373 1.885 
Academic aeSUMacademic  0 8 .76 1.197 1.433 
Entrpreneurial aeSUMentr  0 3 .19 .546 .298 
Senior mgmt.. aeSUMsenior  0 6 1.51 1.370 1.877 
Sign. board aeSUMsignboard  0 7 1.37 1.353 1.831 
# of board 
members aeSUMboard 
 2 9 3.80 1.593 2.539 
Mean board 
member age aeNEWFIRMage 
 25.5 70.7 51.239 7.9770 63.632 
 
Logistic Regression
[DataSet1] /Users/eiriksolafischer/Google Drive/NTNU/2014/Masteroppgave/Forskning og design/
SPSS/SPSS-filer/Hypothesis 1 /Dataset H1.sav
Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa N Percent
Selected Cases Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total
Unselected Cases
Total
7 0 100.0
0 .0
7 0 100.0
0 .0
7 0 100.0
If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.a. 
Dependent Variable 
Encoding
Original Value
Internal 
Value
0
1
0
1
Block 0: Beginning Block
Classification Tablea,b
Observed
Predicted
success Percentage 
Correct0 1
Step 0 success 0
1
Overall Percentage
4 9 0 100.0
2 1 0 .0
70.0
Constant is included in the model.a. 
The cut value is .500b. 
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 0 Constant - .847 .261 10.553 1 .001 .429
Variables not in the Equation
Score df Sig.
Step 0 Variables firmage
software
biopharma
Overall Statistics
1.327 1 .249
.233 1 .630
4.709 1 .030
6.466 3 .091
Block 1: Method = Enter
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step
Block
Model
7.321 3 .062
7.321 3 .062
7.321 3 .062
Page 1
Model Summary
Step
-2 Log 
likelihood
Cox & Snell R 
Square
Nagelkerke R 
Square
1 78.200a .099 .141
Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.a. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 8.907 8 .350
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
success = 0 success = 1
TotalObserved Expected Observed Expected
Step 1 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
7 7.437 1 .563 8
7 7.130 1 .870 8
3 4.764 3 1.236 6
6 4.989 1 2.011 7
6 4.013 0 1.987 6
4 3.986 2 2.014 6
7 6.169 3 3.831 1 0
5 4.897 3 3.103 8
3 3.354 3 2.646 6
1 2.261 4 2.739 5
Classification Tablea
Observed
Predicted
success Percentage 
Correct0 1
Step 1 success 0
1
Overall Percentage
4 9 0 100.0
1 9 2 9.5
72.9
The cut value is .500a. 
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower Upper
Step 1a firmage
software
biopharma
Constant
.226 .165 1.875 1 .171 1.254 .907 1.733
.020 .563 .001 1 .971 1.020 .339 3.073
-1 .747 .835 4.376 1 .036 .174 .034 .896
-3 .416 2.175 2.468 1 .116 .033
Variable(s) entered on step 1: firmage, software, biopharma.a. 
Correlation Matrix
Constant firmage software biopharma
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
1.000 - .984 - .215 .096
- .984 1.000 .098 - .165
- .215 .098 1.000 .139
.096 - .165 .139 1.000
Block 2: Method = Enter
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Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step
Block
Model
14.761 3 .002
14.761 3 .002
22.081 6 .001
Model Summary
Step
-2 Log 
likelihood
Cox & Snell R 
Square
Nagelkerke R 
Square
1 63.440a .271 .384
Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.a. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 6.363 8 .607
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
success = 0 success = 1
TotalObserved Expected Observed Expected
Step 1 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
7 6.830 0 .170 7
7 6.449 0 .551 7
6 7.143 2 .857 8
5 5.993 2 1.007 7
6 5.627 1 1.373 7
6 5.023 1 1.977 7
5 4.554 2 2.446 7
3 3.726 4 3.274 7
4 2.924 3 4.076 7
0 .732 6 5.268 6
Classification Tablea
Observed
Predicted
success Percentage 
Correct0 1
Step 1 success 0
1
Overall Percentage
4 3 6 87.8
1 1 1 0 47.6
75.7
The cut value is .500a. 
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower Upper
Step 1a firmage
software
biopharma
afSUMentr
afSUMsenior
afSUMsignboard
Constant
.201 .190 1.120 1 .290 1.223 .842 1.775
- .501 .686 .534 1 .465 .606 .158 2.323
-2 .330 .934 6.218 1 .013 .097 .016 .607
1.897 1.093 3.011 1 .083 6.668 .782 56.841
1.134 .443 6.559 1 .010 3.107 1.305 7.399
-1 .490 .673 4.908 1 .027 .225 .060 .842
-3 .279 2.528 1.683 1 .195 .038
Variable(s) entered on step 1: afSUMentr, afSUMsenior, afSUMsignboard.a. 
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Correlation Matrix
Constant firmage software biopharma afSUMentr afSUMsenior
afSUMsignbo
ard
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
afSUMentr
afSUMsenior
afSUMsignboard
1.000 - .979 - .153 .050 .038 - .121 - .024
- .979 1.000 .063 - .116 - .014 .067 .002
- .153 .063 1.000 .221 - .213 - .100 - .041
.050 - .116 .221 1.000 - .250 - .278 .271
.038 - .014 - .213 - .250 1.000 .169 - .455
- .121 .067 - .100 - .278 .169 1.000 - .664
- .024 .002 - .041 .271 - .455 - .664 1.000
Block 3: Method = Enter
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step
Block
Model
3.281 3 .350
3.281 3 .350
25.362 9 .003
Model Summary
Step
-2 Log 
likelihood
Cox & Snell R 
Square
Nagelkerke R 
Square
1 60.159a .304 .431
Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.a. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 14.634 8 .067
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
success = 0 success = 1
TotalObserved Expected Observed Expected
Step 1 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
7 6.892 0 .108 7
7 6.667 0 .333 7
6 6.267 1 .733 7
7 5.943 0 1.057 7
5 5.665 2 1.335 7
6 5.385 1 1.615 7
2 4.760 5 2.240 7
3 3.863 4 3.137 7
6 2.847 1 4.153 7
0 .710 7 6.290 7
Classification Tablea
Observed
Predicted
success Percentage 
Correct0 1
Step 1 success 0
1
Overall Percentage
4 3 6 87.8
1 2 9 42.9
74.3
The cut value is .500a. 
Page 4
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower Upper
Step 1a firmage
software
biopharma
afSUMentr
afSUMsenior
afSUMsignboard
afSUMacademic
afSUMindustrial
afSUMother
Constant
.225 .209 1.160 1 .281 1.252 .832 1.886
- .324 .715 .206 1 .650 .723 .178 2.937
-2 .298 1.017 5.105 1 .024 .100 .014 .738
2.293 1.217 3.549 1 .060 9.902 .911 107.565
1.350 .617 4.792 1 .029 3.857 1.152 12.918
-1 .566 .689 5.164 1 .023 .209 .054 .806
- .553 .328 2.839 1 .092 .575 .302 1.094
.023 .403 .003 1 .954 1.024 .465 2.255
- .108 .391 .076 1 .782 .898 .417 1.930
-3 .223 2.843 1.285 1 .257 .040
Variable(s) entered on step 1: afSUMacademic, afSUMindustrial, afSUMother.a. 
Correlation Matrix
Constant firmage software biopharma afSUMentr afSUMsenior
afSUMsignbo
ard
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
afSUMentr
afSUMsenior
afSUMsignboard
afSUMacademic
afSUMindustrial
afSUMother
1.000 - .977 - .182 .062 - .054 .151 - .062 .011
- .977 1.000 .108 - .131 .084 - .130 .026 - .084
- .182 .108 1.000 .183 - .160 .006 - .088 - .117
.062 - .131 .183 1.000 - .273 - .300 .311 .040
- .054 .084 - .160 - .273 1.000 .144 - .485 - .177
.151 - .130 .006 - .300 .144 1.000 - .562 - .292
- .062 .026 - .088 .311 - .485 - .562 1.000 .092
.011 - .084 - .117 .040 - .177 - .292 .092 1.000
- .354 .312 .113 .030 .180 - .295 - .065 .034
- .181 .127 - .144 .089 - .069 - .536 .216 .182
Correlation Matrix
afSUMacade
mic
afSUMindustr
ial afSUMother
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
afSUMentr
afSUMsenior
afSUMsignboard
afSUMacademic
afSUMindustrial
afSUMother
.011 - .354 - .181
- .084 .312 .127
- .117 .113 - .144
.040 .030 .089
- .177 .180 - .069
- .292 - .295 - .536
.092 - .065 .216
1.000 .034 .182
.034 1.000 - .146
.182 - .146 1.000
Block 4: Method = Enter
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step
Block
Model
.628 2 .730
.628 2 .730
25.990 1 1 .007
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Model Summary
Step
-2 Log 
likelihood
Cox & Snell R 
Square
Nagelkerke R 
Square
1 59.531a .310 .440
Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.a. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 8.015 8 .432
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
success = 0 success = 1
TotalObserved Expected Observed Expected
Step 1 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
7 6.889 0 .111 7
7 6.646 0 .354 7
6 6.280 1 .720 7
6 6.092 1 .908 7
7 5.758 0 1.242 7
5 5.392 2 1.608 7
3 4.758 4 2.242 7
3 3.629 4 3.371 7
5 2.853 2 4.147 7
0 .703 7 6.297 7
Classification Tablea
Observed
Predicted
success Percentage 
Correct0 1
Step 1 success 0
1
Overall Percentage
4 2 7 85.7
1 1 1 0 47.6
74.3
The cut value is .500a. 
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower Upper
Step 1a firmage
software
biopharma
afSUMentr
afSUMsenior
afSUMsignboard
afSUMacademic
afSUMindustrial
afSUMother
afNEWFIRMage
afSUMboard
Constant
.227 .214 1.123 1 .289 1.255 .825 1.910
- .408 .754 .292 1 .589 .665 .152 2.917
-2 .239 1.047 4.572 1 .033 .107 .014 .830
2.399 1.265 3.597 1 .058 11.015 .923 131.460
1.271 .631 4.059 1 .044 3.566 1.035 12.286
-1 .391 .728 3.654 1 .056 .249 .060 1.036
- .475 .342 1.934 1 .164 .622 .318 1.215
.043 .439 .010 1 .922 1.044 .441 2.468
- .086 .414 .043 1 .836 .918 .408 2.066
- .040 .052 .606 1 .436 .960 .867 1.063
- .067 .354 .036 1 .850 .935 .467 1.873
-1 .284 3.743 .118 1 .732 .277
Variable(s) entered on step 1: afNEWFIRMage, afSUMboard.a. 
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Correlation Matrix
Constant firmage software biopharma afSUMentr afSUMsenior
afSUMsignbo
ard
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
afSUMentr
afSUMsenior
afSUMsignboard
afSUMacademic
afSUMindustrial
afSUMother
afNEWFIRMage
afSUMboard
1.000 - .698 - .179 .049 .046 .024 .125 .189
- .698 1.000 .093 - .168 .114 - .179 .083 - .032
- .179 .093 1.000 .130 - .154 - .021 - .086 - .129
.049 - .168 .130 1.000 - .302 - .214 .250 - .006
.046 .114 - .154 - .302 1.000 .105 - .420 - .117
.024 - .179 - .021 - .214 .105 1.000 - .582 - .308
.125 .083 - .086 .250 - .420 - .582 1.000 .177
.189 - .032 - .129 - .006 - .117 - .308 .177 1.000
- .157 .322 .188 - .074 .207 - .350 .002 .080
- .074 .203 - .076 - .024 - .019 - .553 .250 .237
- .613 - .025 .188 - .068 - .121 .104 - .265 - .264
- .251 - .158 - .202 .237 - .125 .214 - .182 - .195
Correlation Matrix
afSUMacade
mic
afSUMindustr
ial afSUMother
afNEWFIRMa
ge afSUMboard
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
afSUMentr
afSUMsenior
afSUMsignboard
afSUMacademic
afSUMindustrial
afSUMother
afNEWFIRMage
afSUMboard
.189 - .157 - .074 - .613 - .251
- .032 .322 .203 - .025 - .158
- .129 .188 - .076 .188 - .202
- .006 - .074 - .024 - .068 .237
- .117 .207 - .019 - .121 - .125
- .308 - .350 - .553 .104 .214
.177 .002 .250 - .265 - .182
1.000 .080 .237 - .264 - .195
.080 1.000 .002 - .002 - .392
.237 .002 1.000 - .040 - .327
- .264 - .002 - .040 1.000 .114
- .195 - .392 - .327 .114 1.000
     
   
 LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES success 
  /METHOD=ENTER firmage software biopharma /*Control variables 
  /METHOD=ENTER aeSUMentr aeSUMsenior aeSUMsignboard /*High level network 
  /METHOD=ENTER aeSUMacademic aeSUMindustrial aeSUMother /* Profession related network 
  /METHOD=ENTER aeNEWFIRMage aeSUMboard /*Board specifics 
  /PRINT=GOODFIT CORR CI(95) 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).
Logistic Regression
[DataSet1] /Users/eiriksolafischer/Google Drive/NTNU/2014/Masteroppgave/Forskning og design/
SPSS/SPSS-filer/Hypothesis 1 /Dataset H1.sav
Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa N Percent
Selected Cases Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total
Unselected Cases
Total
7 0 100.0
0 .0
7 0 100.0
0 .0
7 0 100.0
If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.a. 
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Dependent Variable 
Encoding
Original Value
Internal 
Value
0
1
0
1
Block 0: Beginning Block
Classification Tablea,b
Observed
Predicted
success Percentage 
Correct0 1
Step 0 success 0
1
Overall Percentage
4 9 0 100.0
2 1 0 .0
70.0
Constant is included in the model.a. 
The cut value is .500b. 
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 0 Constant - .847 .261 10.553 1 .001 .429
Variables not in the Equation
Score df Sig.
Step 0 Variables firmage
software
biopharma
Overall Statistics
1.327 1 .249
.233 1 .630
4.709 1 .030
6.466 3 .091
Block 1: Method = Enter
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step
Block
Model
7.321 3 .062
7.321 3 .062
7.321 3 .062
Model Summary
Step
-2 Log 
likelihood
Cox & Snell R 
Square
Nagelkerke R 
Square
1 78.200a .099 .141
Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.a. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 8.907 8 .350
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Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
success = 0 success = 1
TotalObserved Expected Observed Expected
Step 1 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
7 7.437 1 .563 8
7 7.130 1 .870 8
3 4.764 3 1.236 6
6 4.989 1 2.011 7
6 4.013 0 1.987 6
4 3.986 2 2.014 6
7 6.169 3 3.831 1 0
5 4.897 3 3.103 8
3 3.354 3 2.646 6
1 2.261 4 2.739 5
Classification Tablea
Observed
Predicted
success Percentage 
Correct0 1
Step 1 success 0
1
Overall Percentage
4 9 0 100.0
1 9 2 9.5
72.9
The cut value is .500a. 
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower Upper
Step 1a firmage
software
biopharma
Constant
.226 .165 1.875 1 .171 1.254 .907 1.733
.020 .563 .001 1 .971 1.020 .339 3.073
-1 .747 .835 4.376 1 .036 .174 .034 .896
-3 .416 2.175 2.468 1 .116 .033
Variable(s) entered on step 1: firmage, software, biopharma.a. 
Correlation Matrix
Constant firmage software biopharma
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
1.000 - .984 - .215 .096
- .984 1.000 .098 - .165
- .215 .098 1.000 .139
.096 - .165 .139 1.000
Block 2: Method = Enter
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step
Block
Model
22.287 3 .000
22.287 3 .000
29.608 6 .000
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Model Summary
Step
-2 Log 
likelihood
Cox & Snell R 
Square
Nagelkerke R 
Square
1 55.913a .345 .489
Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.a. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 2.237 8 .973
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
success = 0 success = 1
TotalObserved Expected Observed Expected
Step 1 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
7 6.892 0 .108 7
7 6.780 0 .220 7
7 7.378 1 .622 8
6 6.252 1 .748 7
6 5.739 1 1.261 7
6 5.284 1 1.716 7
4 5.105 4 2.895 8
4 3.651 3 3.349 7
2 1.662 5 5.338 7
0 .258 5 4.742 5
Classification Tablea
Observed
Predicted
success Percentage 
Correct0 1
Step 1 success 0
1
Overall Percentage
4 5 4 91.8
1 1 1 0 47.6
78.6
The cut value is .500a. 
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower Upper
Step 1a firmage
software
biopharma
aeSUMentr
aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignboard
Constant
.405 .244 2.760 1 .097 1.499 .930 2.417
-1 .010 .786 1.650 1 .199 .364 .078 1.701
-2 .249 .998 5.076 1 .024 .105 .015 .746
- .510 .908 .316 1 .574 .600 .101 3.557
1.279 .428 8.931 1 .003 3.592 1.553 8.309
.127 .315 .162 1 .687 1.135 .612 2.104
-7 .458 3.319 5.049 1 .025 .001
Variable(s) entered on step 1: aeSUMentr, aeSUMsenior, aeSUMsignboard.a. 
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Correlation Matrix
Constant firmage software biopharma aeSUMentr aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignbo
ard
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
aeSUMentr
aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignboard
1.000 - .980 .093 .271 .078 - .437 - .015
- .980 1.000 - .123 - .298 - .059 .347 - .025
.093 - .123 1.000 .183 .324 - .367 - .055
.271 - .298 .183 1.000 - .151 - .181 - .083
.078 - .059 .324 - .151 1.000 - .425 .025
- .437 .347 - .367 - .181 - .425 1.000 - .399
- .015 - .025 - .055 - .083 .025 - .399 1.000
Block 3: Method = Enter
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step
Block
Model
8.015 3 .046
8.015 3 .046
37.623 9 .000
Model Summary
Step
-2 Log 
likelihood
Cox & Snell R 
Square
Nagelkerke R 
Square
1 47.898a .416 .590
Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.a. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 6.435 8 .599
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
success = 0 success = 1
TotalObserved Expected Observed Expected
Step 1 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
7 6.974 0 .026 7
7 6.902 0 .098 7
6 6.712 1 .288 7
6 6.449 1 .551 7
7 6.167 0 .833 7
5 5.727 2 1.273 7
5 4.631 2 2.369 7
5 3.283 2 3.717 7
1 1.835 6 5.165 7
0 .320 7 6.680 7
Classification Tablea
Observed
Predicted
success Percentage 
Correct0 1
Step 1 success 0
1
Overall Percentage
4 6 3 93.9
6 1 5 71.4
87.1
The cut value is .500a. 
Page 11
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower Upper
Step 1a firmage
software
biopharma
aeSUMentr
aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignboard
aeSUMacademic
aeSUMindustrial
aeSUMother
Constant
.724 .307 5.576 1 .018 2.063 1.131 3.763
-1 .474 .927 2.530 1 .112 .229 .037 1.408
-3 .042 1.206 6.362 1 .012 .048 .004 .508
-1 .256 1.191 1.112 1 .292 .285 .028 2.939
1.124 .540 4.329 1 .037 3.078 1.067 8.879
.062 .392 .025 1 .874 1.064 .494 2.293
- .614 .409 2.250 1 .134 .541 .243 1.207
.903 .457 3.898 1 .048 2.466 1.007 6.043
.252 .371 .461 1 .497 1.287 .621 2.665
-11.775 4.308 7.472 1 .006 .000
Variable(s) entered on step 1: aeSUMacademic, aeSUMindustrial, aeSUMother.a. 
Correlation Matrix
Constant firmage software biopharma aeSUMentr aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignbo
ard
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
aeSUMentr
aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignboard
aeSUMacademic
aeSUMindustrial
aeSUMother
1.000 - .985 .282 .494 .381 - .331 - .053 .115
- .985 1.000 - .296 - .511 - .356 .292 .019 - .152
.282 - .296 1.000 .263 .404 - .310 - .132 .035
.494 - .511 .263 1.000 .193 - .239 - .048 .107
.381 - .356 .404 .193 1.000 - .361 - .061 .076
- .331 .292 - .310 - .239 - .361 1.000 - .234 - .086
- .053 .019 - .132 - .048 - .061 - .234 1.000 .158
.115 - .152 .035 .107 .076 - .086 .158 1.000
- .545 .518 - .428 - .359 - .433 - .091 .154 - .158
- .122 .103 .104 - .040 - .023 - .366 - .389 - .146
Correlation Matrix
aeSUMacade
mic
aeSUMindust
rial aeSUMother
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
aeSUMentr
aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignboard
aeSUMacademic
aeSUMindustrial
aeSUMother
.115 - .545 - .122
- .152 .518 .103
.035 - .428 .104
.107 - .359 - .040
.076 - .433 - .023
- .086 - .091 - .366
.158 .154 - .389
1.000 - .158 - .146
- .158 1.000 .148
- .146 .148 1.000
Block 4: Method = Enter
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step
Block
Model
.292 2 .864
.292 2 .864
37.915 1 1 .000
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Model Summary
Step
-2 Log 
likelihood
Cox & Snell R 
Square
Nagelkerke R 
Square
1 47.606a .418 .593
Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.a. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 5.225 8 .733
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
success = 0 success = 1
TotalObserved Expected Observed Expected
Step 1 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
7 6.975 0 .025 7
7 6.912 0 .088 7
6 6.715 1 .285 7
6 6.479 1 .521 7
6 6.178 1 .822 7
7 5.687 0 1.313 7
5 4.580 2 2.420 7
4 3.386 3 3.614 7
1 1.789 6 5.211 7
0 .300 7 6.700 7
Classification Tablea
Observed
Predicted
success Percentage 
Correct0 1
Step 1 success 0
1
Overall Percentage
4 6 3 93.9
6 1 5 71.4
87.1
The cut value is .500a. 
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower Upper
Step 1a firmage
software
biopharma
aeSUMentr
aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignboard
aeSUMacademic
aeSUMindustrial
aeSUMother
aeNEWFIRMage
aeSUMboard
Constant
.725 .312 5.417 1 .020 2.065 1.121 3.804
-1 .449 .945 2.353 1 .125 .235 .037 1.496
-3 .016 1.229 6.019 1 .014 .049 .004 .545
-1 .247 1.242 1.008 1 .315 .287 .025 3.280
1.106 .569 3.772 1 .052 3.022 .990 9.224
.152 .455 .112 1 .738 1.164 .477 2.841
- .568 .431 1.736 1 .188 .567 .243 1.319
.921 .486 3.596 1 .058 2.512 .970 6.507
.210 .395 .282 1 .595 1.233 .569 2.674
- .027 .054 .245 1 .620 .974 .876 1.082
- .013 .386 .001 1 .973 .987 .463 2.103
-10.489 4.943 4.503 1 .034 .000
Variable(s) entered on step 1: aeNEWFIRMage, aeSUMboard.a. 
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Correlation Matrix
Constant firmage software biopharma aeSUMentr aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignbo
ard
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
aeSUMentr
aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignboard
aeSUMacademic
aeSUMindustrial
aeSUMother
aeNEWFIRMage
aeSUMboard
1.000 - .862 .292 .453 .357 - .352 .073 .133
- .862 1.000 - .308 - .511 - .365 .322 .078 - .098
.292 - .308 1.000 .315 .426 - .343 - .158 - .018
.453 - .511 .315 1.000 .212 - .313 - .125 .029
.357 - .365 .426 .212 1.000 - .374 - .113 .027
- .352 .322 - .343 - .313 - .374 1.000 - .117 - .008
.073 .078 - .158 - .125 - .113 - .117 1.000 .265
.133 - .098 - .018 .029 .027 - .008 .265 1.000
- .450 .520 - .448 - .379 - .467 - .009 .279 - .047
- .215 .109 .025 - .061 - .106 - .235 - .328 - .112
- .475 .017 - .125 - .087 - .086 .165 - .227 - .063
.122 - .123 .200 .206 .204 - .303 - .329 - .258
Correlation Matrix
aeSUMacade
mic
aeSUMindust
rial aeSUMother
aeNEWFIRMa
ge aeSUMboard
Step 1 Constant
firmage
software
biopharma
aeSUMentr
aeSUMsenior
aeSUMsignboard
aeSUMacademic
aeSUMindustrial
aeSUMother
aeNEWFIRMage
aeSUMboard
.133 - .450 - .215 - .475 .122
- .098 .520 .109 .017 - .123
- .018 - .448 .025 - .125 .200
.029 - .379 - .061 - .087 .206
.027 - .467 - .106 - .086 .204
- .008 - .009 - .235 .165 - .303
.265 .279 - .328 - .227 - .329
1.000 - .047 - .112 - .063 - .258
- .047 1.000 .189 .023 - .304
- .112 .189 1.000 .270 - .234
- .063 .023 .270 1.000 - .334
- .258 - .304 - .234 - .334 1.000
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